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As a result of a series of significant United States Supreme 
Court decisions over the last twenty-two years,1 the law of defa-
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1. The United States Supreme Court first imposed constitutional restrictions on the 
state common law of defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Solutions to the complicated problems resulting from that initial foray 
into the subject are still being worked out by the Court, as demonstrated in two 
decisions in the last term, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), 
and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). 
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mation has been wrenched from its common law moorings and 
cast adrift in search of a constitutional anchorage. Determining 
precisely what the contours of that First Amendment safe har-
bor are and what they should be, occupies the attention of 
courts, legal scholars, and media lawyers and their clients.2 
Only recently has there emerged in counterpoint to the consti-
tutional debates a more frequently expressed view that the solu-
tions to the problems created by a defamation/free speech 
conflict are more appropriately sought through attempting to 
achieve reform in the arena of tort law instead of through a ma-
nipulation of constitutional doctrines.3 
The major premise of this Article is that a far more precise 
and flexible accommodation of the competing interests can be 
obtained in the context of tort analysis than is likely to result 
from a continuation of the constitutionalization/de-constitution-
alization struggle currently under way.4 The law of torts con-
sistently displays a capacity to produce a carefully tailored 
response to the important nuances of situations in which signifi-
cant individual interests are adversely affected by socially 
worthwhile activities.s Freed from the obligation of having to 
speak in the heavily freighted terms of constitutional adjudica-
tion, courts employing common law methods in developing and 
applying tort law concepts would be able to give careful atten-
tion to factors that might escape constitutional notice. To give 
one example, which will be discussed in some detail later in this 
Article,s consider the current attitude of some members of the 
2. The main thread of the story of the recent developments in the law of libel is 
presented in a very entertaining fashion in R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss: LIBEL, 
THE MEDIA AND POWER (1986), reviewed in LeBel, The Good, The Bad, and The 
Press (Book Review), 1986 DUKE L.J. 929. The Practicing Law Institute courses 
in libel law and litigation also provide a comprehensive, though largely defense-
oriented, survey of recent developments. The most recent course handbook is LI-
BEL LITIGATION 1986 (R. Winfield ed. 1986). 
3. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948, 
2952 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). A similar call for more careful at-
tention to tort law principles in a constitutional tort context is found in Wells, 
The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation 
to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53 (1986). 
4. See id. at 2947, n.7 (plurality opinion criticizing the dissenting opinion for its de-
sire to "constitutionalize the entire common law of libel"). 
5. Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern University has recently completed a 
comprehensive and thoughtful study of contemporary tort law as the Reporter 
for the American Bar Association Special Committee on the Tort Liability Sys-
tem. The report, surveying the full range of policies and principles served by tort 
law, has been published under the title, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, TOWARDS A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUB-
STANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984). 
6. See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court that the first amendment does not permit the 
level of constitutional protection of defamatory communications 
to depend on a distinction between the media and the nonmedia 
status of different defamation defendants.7 One might initially 
suppose that the constitutional language itself would be capable 
of supporting such a distinction-the Court drawing on the 
press clause in the media case and the speech clause in the 
nonmedia case. Nevertheless, the significant point is that the 
distinction between media and nonmedia defendants is the kind 
of factor that fits well into tort law analyses that traditionally 
have been very concerned about such matters as why the de-
fendant acted as it did, and what individual and social interests 
were being served by the defendant's conduct, even though that 
conduct produced injury to the plaintiff.s 
The last example should illustrate that the suggested shift in 
focus to the tort law opportunities for a restructuring of the law 
of defamation is not legitimately subject to dismissal on the 
ground that it is part of an "anti-media" development.9 The 
kind of interest analysis that is a standard part of modern tort 
law may in fact produce a body of decisions that recognizes a 
greater level of protection, based on the media status of the def-
amation defendant, than is likely to be obtained under the first 
amendment analysis the Court is now using.1o The enhanced 
attention to the tort law considerations in defamation analysis 
may thus result in "pro-media" effects as readily as it results in 
what are perceived to be "anti-media" consequences. 
The first section of this Article will lay out in some detail the 
current constitutional framework within which the designers of 
state tort law can operate freely to attempt a reconstruction of 
7. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), the 
Supreme Court rejected a state court rule of decision that determined the appli-
cability of certain types of constitutional protection on the basis of a classification 
of the defendant as media or nonmedia. Even the dissenting opinion, arguing that 
the constitutional protections did apply to the case before the Court, stated that 
determining constitutional protections based on the distinction "is irreconciliable 
with the fundamental First Amendment principle" that the worth of speech does 
not depend on the identity of its source. Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 828 (1977) (factors used in determin-
ing the utility of the defendant's conduct causing an interference with the plain-
tiff's use and enjoyment of land include "the social value that the law attaches to 
the primary purpose of the [defendant's] conduct"). 
9. For criticism of too free a use of the "anti-media" and "anti-first amendment" 
characterizations in discussions of defamation law, see LeBel, supra note 2. 
10. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2958 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (the "solicitude" shown to the press on first amendment issues "im-
plies no endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve 
lesser First Amendment protection"). 
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the law of defamation. Once the constitutional limits have been 
clearly defined, the way will be open for a consideration of a 
series of recommendations for restructuring some of the more 
troublesome nonconstitutional aspects of the defamation action. 
The restructuring may accomplish what has until now not been 
obtained, and may very well not be obtainable, while concen-
trating solely on the constitutional analysis. The adoption of the 
reform proposals offered in Parts II and III of this Article can 
produce a better accommodation of competing and conflicting 
interests, rather than the result that is too often achieved under 
current constitutional analysis, sacrificing one or another set of 
interests to some goal that is perceived to be overriding. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: AN UPDATED 
PRIMER ON NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AND 
ITS PROGENY 
In the years since the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,n 
the United States Supreme Court has decided nearly two dozen defa-
mation cases12 in what must sometimes seem to be a futile attempt by 
11. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
12. For purposes of this description of the constitutional framework regarding the 
common law development of a tort of defamation, the class of "defamation cases" 
includes those cases that are not, strictly speaking, defamation cases, like Bose 
CorP. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Although a 
product disparagement action, it was used by the Court as the vehicle for an im-
portant clarification of one of the constitutional rules regarding defamation litiga-
tion. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text, for discussion of Sullivan rule 
number three, regarding the scope of appellate review in defamation cases. The 
term does not include: (a) invasion of privacy cases, such as Cantrell v. Forest 
City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), in which the Court has drawn on the 
close analogies between some of the privacy actions and defamation cases to in-
COrPOrate a number of the rules derived from its defamation analysis, but without 
using the application of defamation-derived constitutional restrictions on privacy 
actions to expand, in any significant way, on its previously developed defamation 
analysis; (b) defamation cases that turned on questions of statutory interPretation 
rather than constitutional analysis, such as Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 
Locall14, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), determining whether a state law defamation claim 
based on statements made during a union organizing campaign was barred by the 
National Labor Relations Act; (c) criminal defamation cases, such as Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); or (d) due process cases, such as Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693 (1976), involving claims for injury to reputation but which have not ad-
ded to the analysis of constitutional restrictions on the state common law of defa-
mation. 
The title of this section of the Article refers to an "updated primer" on the 
constitutional rules applicable to defamation actions. Earlier articles covering 
the field as of the time of their publication include Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: 
A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); Bros-
nahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel 
Law and the First Amendment, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The Ameri-
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the Court to decide the nature and extent of constitutional protection 
of those sued for defamation. Proceeding on a case-by-case basis, 
sometimes sending messages that run at cross-purposes with prior 
statements,13 the Court has, nevertheless, managed to delineate a 
fairly succinct set of rules that place restraints on how states are per-
mitted to structure a claim for relief from the harm caused by defama-
tory publications. 
The best way to understand what the Court has decided, and 
equally important, what the Court has not decided, is to distinguish 
the content of a rule from its scope of application. The experience of 
the last two decades of defamation cases demonstrates that the Court 
often allows a considerable period of time to elapse between the enun-
ciation of a rule and any clear statement of the range of situations in 
which the rule will apply,14 In order to lay out the constitutional 
framework as clearly as possible, this section of the Article will reduce 
the substantive constitutional rules of defamation to seven require-
ments, four of which will be referred to as Sullivan15 and three of 
which will be referred to as Gertz16 rules. A separate set of four pro-
cedural constitutional rules of primary significance in the pre-trial 
procedure and in the litigation of defamation suits will also be de-
scribed. In connection with each of these rules, the current under-
standing of the scope of the rule's application will also be described. 
Neither an elaborate justification nor a critical evaluation of these 
can Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An 
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 519 (1979); 
Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1975); Smolla, Let 
the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1 (1983). 
13. Compare Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 
(1985) (suggesting that constitutional protection depends on the defamatory pub-
lication being a matter of public concern rather than on the defendant being a 
member of the media) with Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 
1558 (1986) (adopting a rule that explicitly applies to media defendants, but ex-
pressing no opinion on the question whether the same rule would be applied to 
nonmedia defendants). 
14. For example, the scope of the rules announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974), regarding the recovery of presumed damages and punitive dam-
ages by plaintiffs who are neither public officials nor public figures was not set-
tled until the decision more than ten years later in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
15. For the sake of convenience, this Article will employ a convention of referring to 
the Supreme Court defamation cases by the name of the plaintiff in the original 
defamation claim. 
16. These rules are derived from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). A 
fourth idea drawn from the Gertz opinion, which will be referred to in the subse-
quent discussion as a "pseudo-rule," will also be described. See infra notes 116-26 
and accompanying text. 
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rules will be set out in this section of the Article. The focus here will 
simply be to decipher the messages the Court is actually sending, re-
serving for later sections or other articles any sustained commentary 
on how much sense those messages actually make. 
A. The Sullivan Rules 
Constitutional protection for those who cause injury to others 
through the publication of defamatory statements was introduced as a 
limiting factor on the state common law of defamation in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.17 In the course of disapproving the content and 
application of the Alabama defamation rules used by the state courts 
in that case to impose a serious chilling effect on news reporting and 
public commentary on the civil rights struggle in the South,lS the 
Court devised a quartet of rules with which the defamation law of the 
states would be required to conform. Although there has recently 
been some expression of dissatisfaction with both the result and the 
reasoning of the Sullivan case,l9 the opinion written by Justice Bren-
nan for the Court in that case is more often presented as a model of 
constitutional analysis providing protection for the fundamental char-
acter of the American political structure.2o That protection resulted 
from the four substantive constitutional rules adopted by the Court: 
(1) a requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
published the defamatory communication with "actual malice," (2) a 
requirement that the proof of "actual malice" must be made with 
"clear and convincing" evidence, {3) a requirement that appellate 
courts must exercise independent judgment in reviewing a finding of 
"actual malice," and (4) a requirement that the defamatory communi-
cation must refer to, or be "of and concerning," the plaintiff. 
SULLIVAN RULE NUMBER ONE: The 
"Actual Malice" Requirement 
The heart of constitutional protection for defamatory speech lies in 
the heightened level of fault demanded by the Supreme Court in New 
York Times v. Sullivan. Drawing on a few state court cases,21 and 
17. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
18. For the background of the Supreme Court decision in Sullivan, see R. SMOLLA, 
supra note 2, at 26-52; Pierce, The Anatomy of a Historic Decision: New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1964). 
19. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948-
54 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sul-
livan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986). 
20. One of the more influential commentaries on Sullivan is Kalven, The New York 
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 
SUP. CT. REV. 191. 
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280, n.20 (1964). 
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employing the concept of "scienter,"22 the Court held that a prerequi-
site to establishing the liability of the defendants in Sullivan was a 
showing that they had acted with what has (unfortunately)23 come to 
be called "New York Times actual malice," either knowledge that the 
published communication was false or a reckless disregard for the 
truth or falsity of the communication.24 This fault-as-to-falsity re-
quirement25 is intended to serve as a buffer against what the Court 
perceived as an undesirable liability for the innocent or merely care-
less publication of defamatory falsehoods.26 
Determining the scope of this first Sullivan rule was the subject of 
much constitutional adjudication regarding defamation cases in the 
first decade after the Sullivan case was decided. The most important 
issue left open by Sullivan was under what circumstances a plaintiff 
would be required to establish New York Times actual malice. Sulli-
van, itself, involved a very significant, but nonetheless fairly limited 
22. Scienter has had a long history of use in the context of the tort of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation- Part I, 37 Mo. L. REV. 
286, 296-300 (1977). The accurate but somewhat awkward term "New York Times 
scienter" is used in J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
927 (3d ed. 1986). 
23. Use of the common law term "scienter" for the same concept that the Court ex-
presses in the "actual malice" language would have avoided the confusion that 
almost inevitably results from an attempt to use a term that has a plain language 
meaning in a way that deviates substantially from that meaning. The confusion is 
heightened when the term is likely to become a necessary element in the deci-
sionmaking process of a jury unfamiliar with the law. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 
2, at 189 (discussing apparent distortion of jury instruction on "actual malice" 
issue). An arcane term like "scienter" may initially appear to be objectionable on 
the ground that it has no common meaning for the lay public. Precisely that 
feature of the language may, in fact, be an advantage in impressing upon a jury 
the understanding that the rules they are to apply have fairly precise legal mean-
ings that call for careful application rather than simply deciding the case purely 
on common sense or an instinctive reaction. 
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 234, 280 (1964). The nature of the "reck-
less disregard" prong of the "actual malice" requirement has been described in St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), as conduct that 
is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have pub-
lished, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be suf-
ficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing 
with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and dem-
onstrates actual malice. 
Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
25. The phrase "fault-as-to-falsity" is used to distinguish the "actual malice" type of 
fault required in Sullivan from another type of fault that focusses on the likeli-
hood of the publication causing harm to the plaintiff. As will be discussed below, 
infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text, this latter type of fault is both concep-
tually and functionally different from the "actual malice" element which concen-
trates on the defendant's state of mind with regard to whether the 
communication was true or false. 
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-83 (1964). 
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context, the criticism of government conduct in matters of the highest 
social concern.27 Presented with an imposition of liability for a publi-
cation made in that context, the Supreme Court announced an initial 
application of the first Sullivan rule to plaintiffs who were in Sulli-
van's position, public officials suing for defamation based on state-
ments made about their official performance.2s Subsequent cases 
produced an extension of the "actual malice" requirement to defama-
tion plaintiffs categorized as public figures.29 Although a short-lived 
plurality opinion shifted the focus from the public official or public 
figure status of the plaintiff to the public interest nature of the com-
munication,so the Court subsequently held, in one of its clearest pro-
nouncements on the subject of defamation, that the applicability of 
this first Sullivan rule depends on the public person status of the 
plaintiff.31 
One of the most recent Supreme Court defamation cases can be 
interpreted as containing a very strong implication that the public per-
son status of the plaintiff is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the application of the first Sullivan rule. In the process of deciding 
27. Id. at 268. Professor Herbert Wechsler, who argued the Sullivan case in the 
United States Supreme Court on behalf of the New York Times, stated at a con-
ference marking the twentieth anniversary of the decision that he had always 
regarded the case as a civil rights case as much as, if not more than, a defamation 
action. Remarks delivered at PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, New York Times v. 
Sullivan: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1984). 
28. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964) (public official suing for 
damages "for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct"). In Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966), the Court defined the "public official," who 
would be required to satisfy the New York Times actual malice showing, as some-
one who held "a position in government [that] has such apparent importance that 
the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of 
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications 
and performance of all government employees." An extensive and annotated list 
of authorities can be found in Shumadine & Mayo, The Legal and Practical 
Problems Associated with the Determination of Plaintiff's Status as a Private 
Individual, Public Figure or Public Official, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1986, supra 
note 2, at 148-60. 
29. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Although the plurality opinion 
written by Justice Harlan substituted a slightly modified "highly unreasonable 
conduct" standard for the New York Times actual malice fault-as-to-falsity stan-
dard, id. at 155, a majority of the members of the Court approved a simple exten-
sion of the "actual malice" standard to cases brought by plaintiffs who were 
public figures. 
30. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (New York Times actual 
malice standard applies to a case in which the defamatory communication in-
volves "a matter [which] is a subject of public or general interest"). 
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "The New York Times standard 
defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defa-
mation of a public person. . . . [T]he state interest in compensating injury to the 
reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with 
respect to them." Id. at 342-43. 
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the scope of application of a separate set of constitutional rules to be 
discussed below,a2 the plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.aa stated that the Court had previously recog-
nized constitutional restrictions on recovery for defamation only in 
cases that "involved expression on a matter of undoubted public con-
cern."34 Such a reading (arguably revisionist)35 of the prior cases thus 
suggests that should there be a class of defamatory communications 
about a public official that do not involve matters of public concern, as 
the Sullivan requirement that the plaintiff establish "actual malice" 
would not apply. This would be true at least if there were no in-
dependent justification of such a requirement employing the balanc-
ing methodology that the Court now employs to determine the kind 
and degree of constitutional protection of defamatory speech.37 
A final ground of uncertainty regarding the scope of application of 
the first Sullivan rule concerns the relevant status of the defendant, 
32. See irifra notes 88-115 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the scope of 
application of the second and third Gertz rules regarding the award of presumed 
damages and punitive damages in a case in which the Sullivan rules did not apply 
because the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure. 
33. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
34. Id. at 2944. 
35. One could argue that the public interest references in the prior cases in which 
constitutional protection had been recognized were incidental rather than essen-
tial to the reasoning that supported the results. The revisionism that is arguably 
present in Greenmcss Builders would, thus, consist of the Court going back over 
the range of defamation decisions of the previous two decades and moving one of 
the elements of those cases from the periphery to the core of the justification for 
the decisions. This would make the "public concern" nature of the defamatory 
communication a sine qua non of constitutional protection, or at least of the par-
ticular types of protection that have been recognized in the Sullivan and Gertz 
rules. See irifra note 87 for discussion of what constitutional protection might 
apply in a case to which neither the Sullivan nor the Gertz rules apply. 
36. The Greenmcss Builders opinion certainly leaves open the possibility that this 
category of defamatory expression exists as a matter of logic. Whether the practi-
callikelihood of encountering such a communication is at all significant is a dif-
ferent matter. It would not take an overly creative argument to establish that 
virtually anything that could be published about a person who falls into the cate-
gory of public official would be relevant to that person's qualifications for office, 
particularly in the case of an elective office. In the case of an alleged public figure 
plaintiff, the "public concern" factor seems to be at least one element that is used 
in the Court's method of analyzing whether the plaintiff is legitimately deemed 
to be a public figure for purposes of application of the first Sullivan rule. See 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) ("For the most part those 
who attain [public figure] status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the 
o,ffairs of society . ••. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved.") (emphasis added); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (rejecting the defendant's attempt "to equate 
'public controversy' with all controversies of interest to the public"). 
37. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2943-46 
(1985). 
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specifically, whether the rule applies only to defamation actions 
brought against media defendants. The actual strength of some recent 
suggestions that media defendants are in some way, or for some issues, 
to be treated in a way that is different from nonmedia defendants, is 
extremely difficult to pin down.as The strongest indication that the 
media status factor is relevant to the scope of application of the first 
Sullivan rule occurred in a footnote in former Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion for the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire.a9 Noting that 
neither of the lower courts which had decided the case had "consid-
ered whether the New York Times standard can apply to an individual 
defendant rather than to a media defendant," the Chief Justice stated 
that "[t]his Court has never decided the question" and that it was "un-
necessary to do so in this case."40 
The Hutchinson footnote's suggestion that the Sullivan require-
ment of proof of "actual malice" is limited in application to media de-
fendant cases is difficult to square with the precedent against which 
Hutchinson was decided. A number of the early cases in which the 
Court had recognized the applicability of the requirement involved in-
dividual nonmedia defendants.41 Indeed, four of the defendants in the 
Sullivan case itself were nonmedia individuals.42 Perhaps the only 
way that the Hutchinson footnote's suggestion can be reconciled with 
precedent is by attaching some significance to the fact that the individ-
ual defendants in most of the earlier cases were utilizing a member of 
the media as the disseminating outlet of the defamatory communica-
tions.43 However, a focus on that fact seems more properly to raise 
questions concerning media liability for republishing material gener-
ated by a nonmedia source than it does questions about the scope of 
the first Sullivan rule. The working proposition regarding the cur-
rent status of this issue should, therefore, be that the first Sullivan 
38. The media/nonmedia distinction is discussed more fully infra at notes 139-60 and 
accompanying text. 
39. 443 U.S. 111, 133-34 n.16 (1979). The case involved a defamation action in which 
the defendants were a United States Senator and his legislative assistant. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 
356 (1965). 
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
43. This explanation would apply to St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), in 
which the defamatory communication was contained in a televised address by the 
individual defendant, and to Sullivan, in which the individual defendants' names 
were listed as endorsing the message in the New York Times advertisement that 
contained the allegedly defamatory statements. However, even this somewhat 
charitable explanation of the former Chief Justice's grasp of what the Court had 
already decided would fail in the Henry case in which at least one basis for the 
defamation claims was a letter written by the individual defendant to a law en-
forcement official. See Henry v. Collins, 253 Miss. 34, 158 So. 2d 28 (1963); Henry 
v. Pearson, 253 Miss. 62, 158 So. 2d 695 (1963). 
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rule applies to nonmedia as well as to media defendants, at least until 
such time as the Court explicitly holds to the contrary. 
SULLIVAN RULE NUMBER TWO: The Standard 
of Proof Requirement 
The Supreme Court in the Sullivan case introduced not just a 
heightened standard of fault but also a higher standard of proof for 
the plaintiff to meet, an important part of the effort to insulate the 
communicators of defamatory speech from the normal risks of loss in 
litigation. Not comfortable with the exposure to liability generated by 
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of most civil litigation, 
the Court has imposed on defamation plaintiffs the requirement of 
making at least some showings with "convincing clarity."44 This stan-
dard is now understood to be an explicit adoption of the "clear and 
convincing evidence" standard of proof45 previously associated with a 
number of different elements found in some civil actions, including 
the scienter element in a fraud action.46 
The scope of application of this second Sullivan rule is a matter 
that is subject to some uncertainty. Without question, the rule applies 
to the "actual malice" requirement of the first Sullivan rule, at least 
when that requirement is used as a prerequisite to the liability of a 
publisher of a defamatory communication concerning a plaintiff who 
is a public official or a public figure.47 However, as will be shown be-
low, the fault-as-to-falsity standard of the first Sullivan rule operates 
not just as a liability element in public plaintiff defamation cases, but 
also as an element in the determination of the constitutionally permit-
ted measure of damages in private plaintiff cases.48 Whether the 
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). 
45. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 
n.30 (1984); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
The Supreme Court has never attempted to explain what the "clear and con-
vincing'' standard means in the defamation context. The best statement of the 
standard is probably that used by a Connecticut court: "The burden of persua-
sion, therefore, in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing proof is 
sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the 
facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or 
exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not 
exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125, 134 
(1976) (emphasis added). See also Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
372 Mass. 582, 363 N.E.2d 240 (1977). 
46. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 959-61 (3rd ed. 1984). The application of this height-
ened standard of proof to the scienter element of the fraud claim is significant 
because scienter is, as noted supra at notes 22-23 and accompanying text, the clos-
est analogue to the fault-as-to-falsity element that the Court has described as "ac-
tual malice." 
47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
48. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text. 
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"clear and convincing evidence" requirement of this second Sullivan 
rule extends to the use of the standard embodied in the first Sullivan 
rule in this new context has not explicitly been decided by the 
Supreme Court. If the heightened standard of proof does apply to the 
showing of New York Times actual malice in whatever context the 
issue arises, the further question that would be posed is whether the 
Court would hold that every constitutional requirement in a defama-
tion case must be established by "clear and convincing evidence."49 
The best working hypothesis for the scope of this Sullivan rule would 
link the clear and convincing evidence standard to any constitution-
ally required proof of New York Times actual malice. 
SULLIVAN RULE NUMBER THREE: The Scope of Appellate 
Review Requirement 
Rules of law, even the most constitutionally protective of rules, are 
no more than verbal formulations of what legal decisionmakers are 
supposed to do when certain fact patterns appear in disputes that they 
are called upon to resolve. Because rules need to be applied in particu-
lar cases, the content of legal rules can promise protection that is not 
received in fact if the front-line decisionmakers, trial judges and ju-
ries, misunderstand or ignore the rule that is supposed to apply.so In 
order to reduce the chances of there being a substantial divergence 
between the content of the rules and the practice in the courts, the 
49. As will be seen in the following subsections, there are a number of constitutional 
rules applicable to defamation cases that do not have a Sullivan grounding. The 
clearest example of a non-Sullivan rule that would be an unlikely candidate for a 
clear and convincing evidence requirement is the first Gertz rule that allows pri-
vate plaintiffs to recover on a showing of fault less than the knowledge or reck-
less disregard of falsity standard of the first Sullivan rule. See irifra notes 74-87. 
It would be unlikely that the Court would hold that a private plaintiff would be 
constitutionally required to prove negligence as to the falsity of the challenged 
communication by clear and convincing evidence. 
50. The interviews with jurors in the Tavoulareas libel action against The Washing-
ton Post have served as the basis for a number of claims that jury misunderstand-
ing prevented the proper application of the constitutional rules in that case. See, 
e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 188-97; Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Wash-
ington Post Libel Trial, The American Lawyer (November 1982), reprinted in 
LIBEL LITIGATION 1986, supra note 2, at 661. For an account of recent libel litiga-
tion from the plaintiffs perspective, see U. DAN, BLOOD LIBEL (1987); W. TAVOU-
LAREAS, FIGHTING BACK (1985). A recent book by a juror in William 
Westmoreland's libel action against CBS demonstrates a particularly obtuse lack 
of understanding of what the case was all about. See M. ROTH, THE JUROR AND 
THE GENERAL (1986). For example, at one point, the juror writes about her nega-
tive reaction to Dan Burt, plaintiffs lead counsel: 
"I reminded myself not to be swayed by the personalities, especially not an 
attorney's." [So far, so good, one might observe.] 
"Westmoreland was on trial here, not Burt." [The plaintiff is on trial!] 
"As a matter of fact, Westmoreland really is not on trial [Ah, now she's got it 
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Supreme Court has, from the first, held that the application of the 
constitutionally protective fault-as-to-falsity rule in defamation cases 
was subject to an appellate scrutiny that was much less deferential to 
lower court decisionmakers than is normally the case in civil actions.s1 
The decision in the recent case of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of United States, Inc. 52 clarified the point that the scope of appellate 
scrutiny in a case to which the first Sullivan rule applies is governed 
by constitutional considerations, rather than by the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.s3 The Court 
expressed skepticism about the wisdom of relying on the judgment of 
lower court fact finders ~ applying the rules that determine both the 
existence and scope of constitutional protection for marginal forms of 
speech.54 It reiterated the position, which it had previously expressed 
in those kinds of cases, that appellate courts should "conduct an in-
dependent review of the evidence on the dispositive constitutional is-
sue."ss Such an independent review is less than a de novo review of 
the judgment entered by the trial court; it is instead "an independent 
assessment only of the evidence germane to the actual-malice 
determination."56 
This third Sullivan rule regarding the scope of appellate review, 
like the rule dealing with the heightened standard of proof,s7 is sus-
ceptible to broad, intermediate, and narrow views about the scope of 
its application. In the broadest plausible form.,ss the rule would be 
right, the optimistic reader may suppose, only to have that optimism dashed by 
the juror's next observation.]-one portion of his life is." Id. at 147. 
If this frustratingly misguided juror is correct that the trial "was a play of 
sorts," id., she was apparently reading from a different script. 
51. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court did not merely announce the constitutional stan-
dard that was to be applied. Instead, after setting out the requirement that 
knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity had to be established in order for the 
plaintiff to recover, the Court then conducted a review of the evidence "to deter-
mine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for" the plaintiff. 376 
U.S. 254, 284-85. The result of that review by the Supreme Court was a conclu-
sion that "the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity 
which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitu-
tionally sustain the judgment for [plaintiff] under the proper rule of law." Id. at 
285-86. 
52. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
53. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a): "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses." 
54. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. at 505. 
55. Id. at 508. 
56. Id. at 514 n.31. 
57. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
58. The application of this rule of independent review to every fact in a defamation 
case was explicitly rejected by the Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984) ("many findings of fact in a defa-
m!ltion case ... are irrelevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times 
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applied any time a defamation case involved the resolution of an issue 
of "constitutional fact."S9 In contrast, the narrowest reading of the 
rule's application would restrict the independent appellate review to 
the issue of whether New York Times actual malice has been estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence when that finding is used as 
the prerequisite to liability in a defamation action brought by a public 
person plaintiff. so Somewhat less restrictive than that narrow applica-
tion would be an intermediate interpretation that allowed an appellate 
court to exercise this independent appellate review whenever a New 
York Times actual malice finding was required in a defamation case. 
This would be true even if that finding were only used to determine 
the permissible measure of damages for a plaintiff who is not required 
to prove such a heightened level of fault in order to establish the lia-
bility of the defendant.61 This intermediate interpretation would be 
consistent with the working hypothesis offered for the scope of appli-
cation of the clear and convincing evidence requirement of Sullivan 
rule number two.s2 
Co. v. Sullivan ... and to which the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is 
fully applicable"). 
59. The "constitutional fact" doctrine associated with such administrative action 
cases as Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), has 
been largely discredited. See, e.g., 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
§ 29:23, at 441 (2d ed. 1984). As demonstrated in Bose, however, a category of 
what might be called "first amendment facts" continues to receive the heightened 
scrutiny of an independent appellate review previously used in the Ben Avon type 
of case. 
60. This is, in fact, the interpretation that is most consistent with the language actu-
ally used in Bose. In its last statement of the holding, the opinion referred to "a 
case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'' and held that an appellate 
court "in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine 
whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity." Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (emphasis 
added). Because the use of the "actual malice" standard as an element in the 
determination of what damages are constitutionally permissible was introduced 
in Gertz, not Sullivan, see infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text, a case gov-
erned by Sullivan is a case in which only the liability issue depends on a showing 
of "actual malice." Accordingly, the application of the independent appellate re-
view rule to "actual malice" findings used for purposes other than liability would 
not be directly supported by this language of the Bose opinion. 
61. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text (discussion of requirement that 
presumed damages and punitive damages are not recoverable unless the plaintiff 
establishes that the defendant published the defamatory communication with 
"actual malice"). 
62. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. This third Sullivan rule requiring 
independent appellate review also applies to the colloquium element in a defama-
tion action brought by a public official. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying 
text. 
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SULLIVAN RULE NUMBER FOUR: The Colloquium Requirement 
The last of the Sullivan rules concerns the element of the common 
law action for defamation which required the plaintiff to plead and 
prove the colloquium-that the defamatory communication was "of 
and concerning" the plaintiff. 53 A particularly troubling aspect of the 
state court judgment in the Sullivan case was the tenuous link be-
tween the false statements contained in the advertisement published 
by the New York Times and the alleged wrongdoing by the plaintiff, a 
city commissioner and Commissioner of Public Safety.64 With relative 
ease, statements that were ostensibly critical of the state and local 
public authorities in general could be transformed by artful pleading 
into statements that were false and defamatory with regard to a par-
ticular public official. The Supreme Court was struck by the analogy 
between the private common law action for defamation brought by a 
public official and the public action for seditious libel, an action that 
effectively stifles criticism of government.65 The Court's method of 
reducing the risk that the defamation action could be used for the 
same illegitimate purposes as a seditious libel action was to constitu-
tionalize the colloquium element. As a result of this fourth Sullivan 
rule, the plaintiff is constitutionally required to prove that the defam-
atory statements referred to the plaintiff, and were not simply "an 
otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations."66 
By treating the colloquium element as a matter of constitutional 
significance, the Court may have intended to bring this element 
within the scope of the second and third Sullivan rules. If so, the pub-
lic official plaintiff would be required to prove the colloquium element 
by clear and convincing evidence, and the appellate court would exer-
cise an independent review of the evidence pertaining to this ele-
ment.67 Because of the limited scope of the seditious libel analogy on 
which this fourth Sullivan rule rests, the Court has not had occasion 
to determine whether the colloquium element is a matter of constitu-
tional significance in defamation cases other than those which are 
brought by public officials and governed by the Sullivan rules. Ac-
63. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS§ 111, at 783 (5th ed. 1984) [hereirnifter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
64. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-60 (1964). 
65. Id. at 273-78, 288-92. 
66. Id. at 292. 
67. The Sullivan opinion is not clear about whether the colloquium element is sub-
ject to the "convincing clarity" test the Court had earlier applied to the "actual 
malice" element. The Court did, however, perform its own independent review of 
the evidence used to support the reference to the plaintiff, and held that "the 
evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the statements 
referred to" the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the fourth Sullivan rule has been brought 
within the scope of the third Sullivan rule concerning independent appellate 
review. 
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cordingly, the Court has never held, but it may nevertheless be true, 
that any public person plaintiff suing for defamation, public figure as 
well as public official, must satisfy as a constitutional requirement the 
obligation of establishing that the defamatory communication was "of 
and concerning" the plaintiff.GS 
B. The Gertz Rules 
Along with the Sullivan rules for public official and public figure 
plaintiff defamation actions, the Court has developed a distinct set of 
rules for those cases to which the Sullivan rules do not apply. These 
rules place additional or alternative constitutional restrictions on what 
states are allowed to do in structuring a law of defamation. Because 
these rules were first announced by the Court in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.,69 they are conveniently referred to as the Gertz rules. 
During the first ten years in which the Supreme Court issued deci-
sions imposing constitutional restrictions on the common law of defa-
mation, the principal focus was on the scope of application of the 
Sullivan rules outlined in the previous sections.7o While the answers 
to those questions continued to require further refinement,7l. the 
Court took the opportunity presented by the Gertz case to determine 
that the public person status of the defamation plaintiff was the pri-
mary trigger for the constitutional protection that had grown up 
around the Sullivan case.72 Gertz is thus a critically important case 
68. The uncertainty about the scope of application of this fourth Sullivan rule is in-
creased when one considers that even private plaintiffs, who are not subject to 
the Sullivan rules regarding "actual malice," could have to prove that the defam-
atory communications referred to them. Should the second and third Sullivan 
rules be determined to have application to constitutional elements other than the 
fault-as-to-falsity that must be established by public official and public figure 
plaintiffs as a prerequisite to liability, then this constitutional colloquium ele-
ment would be a likely candidate for a similarly expanded application. If that 
were the case, the Court might hold that any defamation plaintiff who is required 
by the constitution to prove some level of fault-as-to-falsity is also constitution-
ally required to prove that the defamatory statements were "of and concerning" 
the plaintiff. 
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
70. See supra notes 21-68 and accompanying text. 
71. Even after Gertz was decided, the Court returned to the troublesome issue of 
what is sufficient to confer "public figure" status, in such cases as Wolston v. 
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 
111 (1979); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974). The public status of the 
plaintiff is referred to as the primary trigger for application of the Sullivan rules 
because of the uncertainty about the scope of the Greenmoss Builders suggestion 
that the content standard-"matter of public concern"-is also a necessary but 
not sufficient requirement for application of constitutional protections, at least at 
the level of what are described below as the second and third of the Gertz rules. 
See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text, and irifra notes 88-115 and accom-
panying text. 
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for its negative proposition that the Sullivan rules do not apply to pri-
vate plaintiffs.73 This section of the Article surveys the positive con-
tribution of the Gertz case-those constitutional rules that apply to a 
case not governed by the Sullivan rules. The most significant feature 
of these rules is that they achieved an extension of constitutional re-
strictions on the tort law of defamation into cases that are outside the 
scope of the Sullivan rules. The three Gertz rules provide that: 
(1) strict liability is not permitted in at least some defamation cases, 
(2) presumed damages may not be recovered unless the plaintiff 
proves that the defendant published the defamatory communication 
with New York Times actual malice, and (3) punitive damages may not 
be recovered unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant published 
the defamatory communication with New York Times actual malice. 
A fourth idea derived from the Gertz opinion, which will be referred 
to as a "pseudo-rule" of Gertz, is that liability for expressions of opin-
ion is prohibited. 
GERTZ RULE NUMBER ONE: The Strict Liability Prohibition 
The central focus of the constitutional protection given to those 
who publish defamatory matter concerning public persons is directed 
to the fault that the defendant displayed about the falsity of the com-
munication.74 So too is fault-as-to-falsity a constitutionally mandated 
element of the defamation action brought by the private plaintiff who 
is subject to the Gertz rules. Rejecting the strict liability that had been 
a part of the common law of defamation for many centuries, 75 the 
Court in Gertz held that the freedom of the states to "define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual" was 
subject to the significant constraint expressed in the Court's qualify-
ing language, "so long as they do not impose liability without fault."76 
The impact of the first Gertz rule is that states are free to set the level 
of fault·as·to-falsity that they wish to demand of private plaintiffs. 
However, no state may set the standard below the constitutional mini· 
mum of negligence with regard to the truth or falsity of the defama-
tory communication, a standard that might be referred to as 
"negligent disregard." 
The scope of application of the first Gertz rule has been the subject 
of a difference of opinion within the states and the lower federal 
courts addressing the issue, 77 and the most recent Supreme Court de-
73. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
74. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
75. See, e.g., L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 14-25 (1978). 
76. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
77. The basic difference of opinion about the scope of application of the first Gertz 
rule concerned whether the rule was limited to those defamation actions that 
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cisions have done little to cure the ambiguity of the language used in 
the original opinion.7s One of the possible limitations on the first 
Gertz rule relates not to fault-as-to-falsity but, rather, to a different 
kind of fault which might be best described as fault-as-to-defamatory-
potential. Immediately after announcing the prohibition on strict lia-
bility, the Court stated that its "inquiry would involve considerations 
somewhat different ... if a State purported to condition civil liability 
on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably 
prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential."79 Because 
such a case was not before it, the Court "intimated[d] no view as to its 
proper resolution."so 
If a communication that patently displays its defamatory potential 
is entitled to the protection of the Gertz rule prohibiting strict liability, 
it is difficult to believe that the Court would decide that less protection 
should be given to a communication that does not put the defendant 
on notice of its defamatory potential. In the patent display case, the 
defendant would be held liable for compounding fault-as-to-falsity 
with fault-as-to-defamatory-potential. In a case in which the defama-
tory potential of the communication was latent, allowing the plaintiff 
to recover without any showing of fault-as-to-falsity would mean that 
the defendant was liable on the basis of conduct which displayed rea-
sonable care with regard to both of the critical fault elements. Per-
haps the best interpretation of the caveat the Court raised in Gertz is 
that in the case in which there is no fault-as-to-defamatory-potential, 
the Gertz prohibition on strict liability is constitutionally insufficient, 
and, therefore, the defendant in such a case is entitled to the fuller 
protection of the Sullivan rules.s1 
The more troublesome ambiguity about the scope of application of 
the first Gertz rule has arisen as a result of the Court's references to 
were brought against media defendants. A number of the courts considering the 
question held that the Gertz rule was not limited in this way and that the prohibi-
tion against strict liability applied to all defamation cases. See cases cited in Dun 
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2942 n.l (1985); 
McNulty, The Gertz Fault Standard and the Common Law of Defamation: An 
Argument for Predictability of Result and Certainty of Expectation, 35 DRAKE L. 
REV. 51, 80 n.256 (1985). 
78. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). 
80. Id. 
81. The result suggested in the text would thus serve to raise the constitutional re-
quirement of fault-as-to-falsity to its highest level in the case in which the publi-
cation itself does not put the publisher on notice of its defamatory potential. This 
would assure that the publisher whose conduct was at fault in only one of the 
relevant ways would be liable only when that fault was of the highest magnitude. 
See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 
3528 (1985). 
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"publishers and broadcasters" as the defendants in the type of cases to 
which the prohibition on strict liability applies.s2 The most literal 
reading of that language limits the rule to cases in which the defend-
ant is literally a "publisher" or a ''broadcaster" in the sense that the 
defendant is a member of the communication media.sa The adoption 
of a different interpretation, extending the first Gertz rule to all defa-
mation cases other than those in which the first Sullivan rule imposes 
a higher standard of liability, would require a court either to ignore 
the explicit language of the Gertz opinion or to treat that language as a 
case-specific reference to the type of defendant actually before the 
Court, not as an expression of a limitation on the scope of the rule's 
application. 
Choosing between (1) a universal application of the first Gertz rule 
and thus a complete abolition of strict liability for defamation, and 
(2) a limited application of the rule to cases brought by private plain-
tiffs against media defendants, is a task that the Supreme Court may 
still have to perform. Neither the Greenmoss Builders decision which 
appears to reject the status of the defendant as the criterion for appli-
cation of constitutional protection of defamatory speech,B4 nor the 
Hepps decision which appears to reintroduce the media status of the 
defendant as a decisive factor,s5 involved a question of the application 
of the first Gertz rule.ss Because of this uncertainty about the rele-
vance of media status, the possibility has not been foreclosed that, con-
sistent with the Constitution, strict liability may be imposed on a 
nonmedia defendant who has published defamatory matter about a 
private plaintiff.s7 
82. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 373, 347 (1974). 
83. See, e.g., Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983); rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 
(1985). 
84. As described infra at notes 100-08 and accompanying te:A-t, the Greenmoss Build-
ers decision substitutes a focus on the content of the defamatory communication 
for the state court's distinction between media and nonmedia defendants. 
85. The media status of the defendant is explicitly used as a factor in the scope of 
application of the Hepps rule concerning the burden of proving the falsity of the 
defamatory communication. See infra notes 134.66 and accompanying text. 
86. Because the defendant's conduct could be deemed to be at least negligent, the 
issue of whether the defendant could be held strictly liable was not before either 
the state supreme court or the United States Supreme Court in Greenmoss Build-
ers. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941-
42 (1985). Neither of the state courts in Hepps questioned the requirement that 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at fault in publishing the defama-
tory communication. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 
1560-61 (1986). 
87. If the question should be presented squarely to the Supreme Court, the language 
of the Greenmoss Builders plurality opinion contains enough flexibility for the 
Court to be able to decide that this first rule of Gertz does apply to cases in which 
the other two Gertz rules did not apply, i.e., to cases in which the defamatory 
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GERTZ RULE NUMBER TWO: The Restriction 
on Presumed Damages 
Initially the Court decided that the level of fault required by the 
first Sullivan rule was not constitutionally mandated in a defamation 
action brought by a private plaintiff, as but, nevertheless, adopted as its 
first rule for cases not governed by Sullivan a weaker version of the 
fault-as-to-falsity standard that it had first announced ten years ear-
lier. The major innovation in Gertz was a concern for the remedial 
consequences of a defamation action, when the Court considered what 
damages could constitutionally be recovered by a plaintiff establishing 
a defendant's liability on the lower fault showing permitted in a pri-
vate plaintiff action. 
The traditional common law rule of libel had entertained the pre-
sumption that defamatory material capable of injuring the reputation 
of the plaintiff actually did cause that injury.s9 Accordingly, even 
without proof of actual harm to reputation, or of any pecuniary loss 
actually attributable to that reputational harm, a libel plaintiff could 
recover what the common law referred to as presumed damages, more 
accurately described as damages intended to compensate for harm that 
the plaintiff had not proved was actually incurred. Finding an insuffi-
cient justification for an award of such damages in every defamation 
case,90 the Supreme Court adopted as a second rule in Gertz there-
striction that presumed damages could only be awarded on a showing 
publication is about a matter of no public concern. The Court's balancing analysis 
in Greenmoss Builders focussed on the weight to be accorded to the state interest 
in providing presumed damages and punitive damages to a private defamation 
plaintiff; that analysis could very well produce a different result when applied to 
the separate issue of strict liability. For example, a state may be deemed to have a 
legitimate interest in fostering the compensatory aim of the defamation action by 
allowing the recovery of presumed damages. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985). The Court could neverthe-
less hold that the state interest in providing a strict liability claim for relief is 
either illegitimate or not weighty enough to offset whatever constitutional inter-
est opposes the imposition of strict liability. 
Furthermore, when the plurality opinion stated that "speech on matters of 
purely private concern" is not totally unprotected by the first amendment, id. at 
2946, the opinion's author might very well have had in mind the strict liability 
question that was not before it as the issue on which the "less stringent" protec-
tions of the first amendment would, nevertheless, call for a restriction on the 
state law of defamation. But see id. at 2953 (White, J., dissenting) ("Although 
Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with respect to 
presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the Gertz requirement of some 
kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as 
this."). 
88. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
89. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 93. This presumption operated in a more 
limited fashion when the defamatory communication was characterized as slan-
der rather than libel. See infra note 98. 
90. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). 
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of fault-as-to-falsity that satisfied the first Sullivan rule, i.e., knowl-
edge that the communication was false or reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the communication.91 
Before considering the recent developments that provide a basis 
for understanding the scope of this second Gertz rule, it is first neces-
sary to consider carefully what the Court actually decided. The consti-
tutional restriction on recovery of presumed damages did not entail 
two other measures that the Court might have adopted: first, recovery 
was not limited to compensation for reputational injury, and second, 
recovery was not limited to what the common law referred to as spe-
cial damages. 
The second rule adopted by the Court in Gertz permits recovery, on 
a showing of fault less than New York Times actual malice, of mone-
tary damages for all harm to the plaintiff actually proved to have been 
caused by the defendant's publication of the defamatory communica-
tion. This harm is explicitly not limited to reputational injury.92 In-
stead, the Court has recognized that defamatory communications have 
as much potential for inflicting such personal injuries as emotional 
distress as they do for injuring the reputation of the plaintiff, and 
therefore, that plaintiffs deserve to be compensated for these non-
reputational harms.93 
Although the absence of reputational harm may appear to remove 
the plaintiff's claim for relief from the realm of defamation, the ab-
91. Id. at 349. 
92. The recovery does seem, however, to be limited to personal harm rather than to 
encompass harm to society. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 
(1984), Justice Rehnquist, writing for a nearly unanimous Court, referred to the 
interest of a state in protecting its citizens from the effects of defamatory false-
hoods introduced into the stream of communications distributed within the state. 
Id. at 776-77. To the extent that the imposition of liability for monetary damages 
would serve to further that state interest, the current law of defamation simply 
relies on an award of damages for harm to the plaintiff as the vehicle. Punitive 
damages, under the more restrictive rule proposed irifra at notes 294-305 and ac-
companying text, would be a better means of fulfilling this function. 
93. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("the more customary 
types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of 
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental 
anguish and suffering'') (emphasis added). This aspect of the Gertz decision was 
made even more explicit in the subsequent decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 
U.S. 448 (1976). The plaintiff in that case, held by the Supreme Court to be a 
private person to whom the Gertz rule as to fault would apply, had withdrawn 
her claim for damages to reputation prior to the start of trial. Id. at 460. The 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was precluded from 
any recovery, and stated that the action was not transformed "into something 
other than an action for defamation as that term is meant in Gertz" by the failure 
to assert a claim for reputational harm. Id. (emphasis added). A decision "to 
forgo recovery for injury to her reputation" did not prevent the plaintiff "from 
obtaining compensation for such other damages that a defamatory falsehood may 
have caused her." Id. 
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sence of such harm is, in fact, perfectly consistent with both tradi-
tional and modern defamation theory.94 The plaintiff who is unable to 
establish actual injury to reputation but who can establish other harm 
still has a claim for relief that sounds in defamation because of the 
capacity or the potential that the communication possesses for causing 
reputational injury. It is this capacity for reputational harm that is at 
the core of the defamation action9s and constitutes the gravamen of 
the wrongful conduct of the defendant in publishing material that has 
this capacity. The fact that on the occasion of a particular publication 
the reputational injury was not suffered or, as is more likely, simply 
cannot be proved, does not relieve the defendant of the obligation to 
compensate the plaintiff for the other foreseeable types of harm that 
the publication actually did cause on that occasion.96 
The second Gertz rule, restricting the recovery of presumed dam-
ages, is also distinguishable from the common law rule that requires 
proof of special damages in certain circumstances. Special damages, in 
the context of the law of defamation, constitute a narrow category of 
recovery consisting of pecuniary losses directly attributable to the 
harm to reputation caused by the defamatory communication.97 Typi-
cally, the common law required the plaintiff to prove the existence of 
this kind of harm in a slander case. In order to avoid the requirement 
of proof of special damages, the plaintiff's slander action had to fall 
into one of a number of standard categories of defamatory content 
which carried with it a strong likelihood that reputational harm did 
actually occur.9s 
The importance of the distinction between the special damages 
rule of the common law and the second Gertz rule lies in the different 
94. Recognizing that the assertion in the text is not free from controversy, offered 
below is a substantive reform that explicitly accomplishes what is asserted here 
as already a part of defamation law. See infra notes 237-62 and accompanying 
text. The reform that is proposed below is more sweeping than the present asser-
tion since it would serve to bring within the scope of the current constitutional 
rules all the tort actions that attempt to evade those rules by artfully avoiding 
any claim for reputational injury. 
95. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 31-41 (discussing authorities on the 
"definition of defamatory"). 
96. But see Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 747 (1984) (article offers the thesis that "compensating individuals for actual 
harm to reputation is the only legitimate purpose of defamation law today'') (em-
phasis added). Comments of the author on Professor Anderson's proposal are in 
LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the .Affair, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 779 (1984). See also Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations 
on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solu-
tion", 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793 (1984). 
97. See, e.g., Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54 (1858); L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 
199-200. 
98. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 94-150 (describing categories of 
"slander per se"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 570-74 (1977). 
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answers those rules provide to the question of whether it is necessary 
for the plaintiff to be able to attribute the nonreputational harm that 
the plaintiff can actually prove to some reputational harm that was 
caused by the communication. Let the symbol ">" stand for the 
phrase "is a legal or proximate cause of." In a case involving the clas-
sic kind of special damages, the consequences of the defendant's con-
duct that must have occurred if the plaintiff was to recover could be 
displayed as: 
Defamatory Reputational Pecuniary 
Publication > Injury > Loss 
Once the plaintiff had established each of the elements of this causal 
chain, the common law would permit a recovery of damages for any 
actual harm as well as presumed damages.99 
The kind of recovery that is constitutionally permitted under the 
second Gertz rule can be represented by a simpler causal chain: 
Actual Defamatory 
Publication > Nonreputational 
Injury 
The middle element of the earlier example, reputational injury, is not 
required, nor is the harm for which recovery is allowed restricted by a 
preliminary requirement of proof of pecuniary loss. 
A simple example will serve to illustrate the significance of this· 
distinction. Assume that Sleazo Enterprises publishes a defamatory 
statement about Earl under circumstances in which a judicial fact 
finder would conclude that Sleazo had failed to exercise reasonable 
care in determining the truth or falsity of the communication. If Earl 
should lose his job, or even if he should lose the identifiable prospect 
of a job, because of the damage that the defamatory publication caused 
to his reputation, Earl would be able to establish the special damages 
that were sometimes required at common law. But suppose instead 
that Earl reacts to the publication in a way that demonstrates the oc-
currence of legitimate emotional distress which causes him to with-
draw from normal contacts with society and thus to become less 
effective in his job. Each of those reactions constitutes actual harm 
attributable to the publication, with the latter probably even constitut-
ing a pecuniary loss, but neither reaction would be attributable to the 
harm to his reputation. Having failed to establish that additional 
causal nexus between the actual nonreputational harm and some ac-
tual injury to reputation, Earl would not be able to prove special dam-
ages. The Gertz rule restricting the recovery of presumed damages 
would keep Earl from recovering damages for any unproven harm 
that he claims to have suffered. ICC However, the Gertz rule does allow 
99. See PROSSER & KEEToN, supra note 63, § 122, at 794-95. 
100. This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff is unable to prove the more aggravated 
levels of fault-as-to-falsity that constitute New York Times actual malice and that 
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him to recover for this actual harm on a showing of the existence of 
the simpler causal nexus between the actual harm and the defendant's 
publication of a statement capable of causing reputational injury. 
The scope of application of the second Gertz rule was addressed in 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,1o1 one of the 
Supreme Court's most recent defamation decisions. Mfirming a state 
court judgment that allowed the recovery of presumed damages on a 
showing that the defendant's conduct consisted of negligence rather 
than New York Times actual malice,1o2 the Court held that the second 
Gertz rule did not apply to defamation actions brought by private 
plaintiffs unless the defamatory statements involved a matter of pub-
lic concern.1oa Having introduced a newly critical factor into the con-
would therefore serve as the basis for a recovery of presumed damages under the 
second Gertz rule. 
101. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
102. The state court judgment is reported in Greerunoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). The state 
court judge before whom the case was tried instructed the jury that the defend-
ant, Dun & Bradstreet, as a commercial credit rating agency, was entitled to a 
qualified privilege that could be lost through malice or bad faith in publishing the 
report. The term "malice" was given at least four distinct meanings in the in-
struction, including (a) an intent "to injure the Plaintiff in its business,'' 
(b) acting "in a willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and interests of 
the Plaintiff,'' (c) making the report about the plaintiff "with reckless disregard 
of the possible consequences,'' and (d) making the report "with the knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Joint Appendix 
to Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent at 18-19, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). The instruction, thus, provided the 
jury with a basis for deciding that the defendant's common law qualified privilege 
could have been defeated and the defendant held liable on any one of the stated 
grounds which ranged from a common law malice in the sense of ill will toward 
the plaintiff, which was option (a), all the way up to New York Times actual mal-
ice, which was option (d). Given the instruction that was delivered by the trial 
judge, a verdict for the plaintiff would necessarily rest on a finding of fault 
greater than "mere negligence,'' id. at 18, and, thus, the requirement of the first 
Gertz rule would have been satisfied in this case. See supra notes 74-87 and ac-
companying text. A general verdict for the plaintiff would, however, obscure the 
jury's choice between some form of common law malice (options a-c) and that 
portion of the instruction that incorporated the New York Times actual malice 
standard (option d). The trial judge's instruction further informed the jury that 
the communication was libelous per se because the report consisted of "words 
which tend to impute the insolvency of a business,'' Joint Appendix to Briefs for 
Petitioner and Respondent at 17, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, 
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) and that damage and loss were, therefore, conclusively 
presumed if the defendant was liable, with no obligation on the plaintiff to prove 
actual damages. Id. at 17, 19. 
103. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985) 
("permitting recovery of presumed . . . damages in defamation cases absent a 
showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the de-
famatory statements do not involve matters of public concern"). 
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stitutionallaw affecting defamation actions,104 the plurality opinion 
by Justice Powell provided little guidance for the determination of 
what is a matter of public concern. Borrowing from a prior decision 
from a situation other than defamation, the Powell opinion identified 
content, form, and context105 as the factors used in deciding whether 
speech is a matter of public concern, and thus "at the heart of the First 
Amendment's protection."106 If instead it is a matter of purely private 
concern, the speech is "not totally unprotected by the First Amend-
ment," but it is given "protections [that] are less stringent."107 In ap-
plying the three factors, the plurality opinion relied on such matters 
as (1) the lack of any public issue contained in the credit report pub-
lishing the defamatory falsehood about the plaintiff, (2) the fact that 
interest in the content of the credit report was limited to the defend-
ant and its specific business audience, and (3) the profit motive for the 
defendant publishing the credit report, making the defendant's form 
of speech "hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regu-
lation."10S Defamatory speech determined in such a fashion to be 
outside "the heart of the First Amendment's protection" is, therefore, 
to be denied the protection of the second Gertz rule, allowing the 
plaintiff, about whom such statements are made, to recover presumed 
damages on a showing of fault-as-to-falsity less than New York Times 
actual malice. 
GERTZ RULE NUMBER THREE: The Restriction 
on Punitive Damages 
Along with the restriction on presumed damages, the Supreme 
Court in Gertz also prohibited the recovery of punitive damages on a 
showing of fault-as-to-falsity not meeting the New York Times actual 
malice standard.109 Although the Court has since routinely collapsed 
the second and third Gertz rules into a single rule regarding "pre-
sumed or punitive damages,"no this third Gertz rule's restriction con-
cerning punitive damages should be maintained separate from the 
second Gertz rule on presumed damages. The two items of damages 
have different meanings and different rationales, as the Supreme 
Court at least implicitly recognized in the Gertz case.111 Presumed 
damages permit compensation for unproven harm, while punitive 
104. See supra note 35. 
105. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2947 (1985) 
(citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). 
106. Id. at 2945 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766 (1978)). 
107. Id. at 2946. 
108. Id. at 2947. 
109. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
110. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986). 
111. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
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damages lack any overt compensatory rationale.l12 The fact that the 
Supreme Court has chosen to impose the same constitutional restric-
tion on their recovery should not lead to a routine failure to recognize 
their different nature and function. 
The distinction between the two types of damages, at least from 
the perspective of the constitutional limitations on their recovery, was 
eroded by the Greenmoss Builders decision. The Court determined 
that recovery of such damages was constitutionally permitted as long 
as a private plaintiff had made a showing that the defendant acted 
negligently with regard to the falsity of a defamatory communication 
not involving a matter of public concern.l13 Having made at least 
some effort to justify the state interest in favor of an award of pre-
sumed damages in a case that does not involve a matter of public con-
cern,l14 the plurality opinion by Justice Powell simply tacked on the 
punitive damages category as a remedy that was similarly available on 
a showing of less than the New York Times actual malice standard.l15 
THE GERTZ PSEUDO-RULE: The Prohibition of Liability for 
Expression of Opinion 
Liability for defamation at common law has traditionally been lim-
ited to false statements of fact.n6 Drawing both on this common law 
tradition and on the "self-government" rationale expressed in the Sul-
livan opinion,l17 the Supreme Court in Gertz stated as a matter of the 
Constitution's "common ground" that "[u]nder the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea."ns Even opinions that the Court 
labels "pernicious" are to be corrected not in a judicial forum but 
rather through "the competition of other ideas."l19 
The Supreme Court's dictum concerning this constitutional com-
112. The nature and function of presumed damages and punitive damages are dis-
cussed in more detail in the context of suggested reforms in the law governing 
the award of both types of remedies, irifra notes 295-97 and accompanying text. 
113. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985). 
See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text. 
114. The opinion identified an effectiveness rationale for presumed damages, sug-
gesting that a denial of recovery for unproven but, nevertheless, very likely harm 
would keep the defamation liability judgment from effectively serving a compen-
satory function. Id. at 2946. 
115. The state interest justifying presumed damages was not explicitly extended into 
an explanation of why punitive damages should be allowed. Instead, the opinion 
moved directly from a cursory statement in support of presumed damages to a 
conclusion that both presumed damages and punitive damages should be allowed. 
I d. 
116. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, at 813-15 (discussion of a taxonomy of 
opinion and how the different categories should be treated). 
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-79 (1964). 
118. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
119. Id. at 339-40. 
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mon ground has been inflated into a constitutional rule to the effect 
that the first amendment places an absolute prohibition on liability for 
expressions of opinion. This rule, built by lower courts on the founda-
tion of the Gertz dictum120 (and for that reason here referred to as a 
Gertz pseudo-rule), raises some substantial problems in application. 
Perhaps most troubling is the difficulty in drawing a line between fact 
and opinion as categories of speech.121 Even if that distinction should 
prove relatively easy to make in a particular circumstance,122 a further 
problem is created by the common law exception to the "no liability 
for opinion" rule which recognized that statements of opinion can ap-
pear to be based on facts known to the speaker but not to the audi-
ence.123 When those apparent underlying facts are false, the same 
kind of defamatory communication can be produced by an ostensible 
expression of opinion as would have been produced by a more straight-
forward assertion of the unstated facts. The speaker should not be 
permitted to escape legal accountability for the adverse effects of the 
communication simply by an artful screening of the falsity of the fac-
tual basis for the opinion. If the first amendment is to be declared by 
the Supreme Court to be a bar to the imposition of liability for expres-
sions of opinion, the question of the continued validity of this common 
law exception to the nonliability rule needs to be addressed carefully. 
Perhaps one best reads the Gertz dictum as part of the broader ra-
tionale for protecting false statements of fact. Such statements have 
no constitutional value but are nonetheless protected because of a fear 
that publishers and judicial fact finders will be unable to discern with 
any dependable regularity the location of the line between constitu-
120. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir.1984), and the cases cited 
by that court at 974 n.6. 
121. The en bane opinion in Ollman stated that in "distinguishing between assertions 
of fact and expressions of opinion," id. at 978, "courts should analyze the totality 
of the circumstances in which the statements are made to decide whether they 
merit the absolute First Amendment protection enjoyed by opinion," id. at 979. 
The four factors to be considered "in assessing whether the average reader would 
view the statement as fact or, conversely, opinion," id., include: (1) "the common 
usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves," id. at 979-80, 
(2) "the degree to which the statements are verifiable," id. at 981, (3) "the context 
in which the statement occurs," id. at 982, and (4) "the broader social context into 
which the statement fits,'' id. at 983. 
122. For the view that the fact-opinion distinction is "irrelevant" and should be 
avoided, see Franklin & Busse!, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Aware-
ness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 869-87 (1984). See also Ollman v. 
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, C.J., concurring) (asserting the 
inadequacy of a "rigid doctrinal framework [of an opinion/fact formula] to re-
solve the sometimes contradictory claims of the libel laws and the freedom of the 
press"). 
123. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, at 814-15; RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 566 (1977). 
276 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:249 
tionally valuable and valueless speech.124 A sense of reliance on the 
"marketplace of ideas" image125 could lead the Court to a conclusion 
that opinions, whether "pernicious" or not, are particularly suscepti-
ble to being countered by facts and by other opinions in ways that false 
statements of fact are not. When expressions of opinion are not func-
tionally different from false statements of fact, as is likely to be the 
case when a speaker creates the impression of basing the opinion on 
undisclosed facts which are actually false and defamatory, the ration-
ale of competition in the marketplace would leave room for a limited 
liability for such expressions of opinion.12s This liability would serve 
to counteract the effects of the "unfair advantage" that this type of 
communication enjoys in the competition with opinions that are not 
based on false and defamatory unrevealed facts. Whether such flexi-
bility will be displayed by the Supreme Court or whether the Court 
will instead explicitly adopt an absolute prohibition on any speech 
that can be labelled an expression of opinion remains to be seen. In 
any event, it appears to be desirable for the Court to take an opportu-
nity to address the opinion issue in a context in which there will be a 
more authoritative statement than the dictum of the Gertz opinion 
provides. 
C. The Miscellaneous Procedural Rules 
The constitutional rules outlined above have transformed the defa-
mation action from a strict liability tort, in which injury to reputation 
and damages were often presumed, into an action in which the major 
constitutional focus is usually on the degree of fault displayed by the 
defendant when publishing the allegedly defamatory material. Legal 
rules, even those of a constitutional nature, do not exist in a vacuum. 
They are meant to be applied in a trial and are designed to resolve the 
dispute between litigants with an actual grievance. While the consti-
tutional rules of Sullivan and Gertz are addressed primarily to the 
substance of the action for defamation, the rules themselves and the 
underlying policies that led to the adoption of the rules have raised 
additional questions about the manner in which the defamation law-
suit can be permitted to be litigated. 
At the same time that the Supreme Court has been wrestling with 
the issues regarding the fault and remedy elements of a constitution-
ally acceptable action for defamation, the Court has also been con-
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-41 (1975). See generally Schauer, 
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling E;ffect", 58 B.U.L. 
REV. 685, 705-14 (1978). 
125. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1975). See also Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1. 
126. The role of the "marketplace" idea is considered again, infra notes 220-22 and 
accompanying text. 
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cerned with some of the procedural implications of the substantive 
rules it has adopted. A number of these implications extend beyond 
the scope of mere trial strategy and involve constitutionally significant 
considerations. Accordingly, the Court has recognized certain consti-
tutional rules that govern the litigation process of the defamation ac-
tion. This subsection of the Article describes the nature and scope of 
four constitutional procedural rules that have been adopted by the 
Court in the course of developing a body of substantive constitutional 
defamation law: (1) the acceptability of a plaintiff's use of the discov-
ery process to obtain information about the defendant's fault-as-to-fal-
sity, (2) the necessity for the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the 
defamatory statements, (3) the availability of summary judgment for a 
defendant on the issue of whether the plaintiff has established New 
York Times actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and 
( 4) the applicability of state long-arm jurisdictional standards to defa-
mation actions without those standards being affected by any special 
first amendment considerations. 
THE HERBERT RULE: The Discovery Process 
The most significant prerequisite of liability for defamation is 
proof of the fault of the defendant in failing to prevent the publication 
of false material capable of injuring the reputation of another. Both 
the Sullivan rule for public official and public figure plaintiffs127 and 
the Gertz rule for private plaintiffs128 insist that liability may not be 
imposed unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant's conduct dis-
played the relevant degree of fault-as-to-falsity. Fifteen years after 
the Supreme Court first interjected this fault element into the defa-
mation action as an element of constitutional significance, the Court 
explicitly adopted, in Herbert v. Lando,129 the logical corollary to the 
New York Times actual malice rule. The Court specified that a defa-
mation plaintiff was permitted to use the civil litigation system's dis-
covery process to determine whether the defendant's conduct 
displayed the knowledge of falsity or the reckless disregard of truth or 
falsity that the Sullivan case puts at the heart of a defamation claim 
asserted by a public official or a public figure plaintiff. 
The Herbert rule follows logically from earlier decisions that recog-
nized that the constitutional rules provide, at most, a qualified privi-
lege to publish defamatory falsehoods about a plaintiff. If some level 
of fault-as-to-falsity is the criterion on which the defendant's constitu-
tional protection can be lost, the only manner in which the existence 
of the criterion can be determined is through an investigation of the 
127. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text. 
129. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.153, 169-75 (1979). 
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process the defendant used to form a belief regarding the truth or fal-
sity of the communication. Because the pre-litigation discovery pro-
cess is intended to be a means of preventing surprise and developing 
relevant evidence to be used at trial,I30 a plaintifrs pretrial inquiry 
into the defendant's fault-as-to-falsity is obviously a proper matter for 
discovery. The inescapable conclusion about discovery concerning the 
issue of a defamation defendant's fault-as-to-falsity is that anything 
short of the rule announced in Herbert would have transformed a de 
jure qualified privilege into a de facto absolute privilege. 
The logical necessity of the Herbert rule does not, by itself, provide 
a sufficient policy justification for the rule. One could argue that the 
greatest intrusion into the reporting and editorial process seems to oc-
cur in those cases that are at the heart of the New York Times v. Sulli-
van concern, i.e., published commentary about vitally important 
national issues involving allegations of government misconduct.I31 
These are, after all, the situations that are likely to evoke the kind of 
commitment of resources by defamation defendants who are news or-
ganizations with a high interest in protecting the confidentiality of 
their editorial processes. In these cases, the public official plaintiff is 
given the opportunity to use the pretrial discovery process to develop 
proof "that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication."I32 The result might be viewed as a much less 
desirable scrutiny into media decisionmaking than would have been 
possible under a defamation action that removed the emphasis from 
the subjective fault-as-to-falsity displayed by the defendant.133 More 
attention needs to be given to the wisdom of the discovery potential 
opened up by the Herbert rule and to the correction of possible abuses 
that such discovery can produce. The point that needs to be under-
stood clearly in this review of the current state of the constitutional 
defamation rules is that any adverse consequences attributable to the 
130. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 227-30 (3d ed. 1985). 
131. Herbert was a case in which a public figure plaintiff sued a media defendant about 
a defamatory communication that involved a matter of public concern. The case, 
thus, falls squarely within the category of defamation actions in which the Court 
has recognized the most extensive constitutional protection of the defamatory 
speech. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. It would be unlikely that 
the Court would decide that the discovery opportunities upheld by the Herbert 
rule were unavailable in a case in which less protection applied, for example, a 
private plaintiff case, or a case involving a defamatory communication that was 
not a matter of public concern. 
132. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (describing the conduct that con-
stitutes the reckless disregard of truth or falsity required by the first Sullivan 
rule). 
133. Under the common law of defamation prior to the Sullivan case, inquiry into the 
fault of the defendant would usually have been relevant only if the defendant 
was relying on one of the qualified privileges that could be defeated by showing 
that the defendant published a defamatory communication knowing that it was 
false. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 526-32. 
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Herbert rule are, in fact, simply the logical outgrowth of the Sullivan 
and Gertz rules-rules that attempted to protect defamation defend-
ants by placing the issue of fault-as-to-falsity at the center of virtually 
every significant defamation case. Thus, the Herbert rule is itself in 
large measure a false target, and reform efforts are probably better 
directed at the Sullivan and Gertz rules themselves. 
THE HEPPS RULE: The Burden of Proving Falsity 
One of the most recent of the constitutional rules, adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,134 ad-
dressed a procedural matter that had been left unresolved, or at least 
less than completely clear, through the previous two decades of the 
constitutionalization of the law of defamation. The precise issue is de-
ceptively simple: which of the parties to a defamation action bears the 
burden of proof with regard to the truth or falsity of the defamatory 
publication. Is the plaintiff obliged to prove that the defamatory com-
munication was false in order to establish liability, or, as was the case 
under the pre-Sullivan law of defamation,135 is the defendant obliged 
to prove the truth of the defamatory publication in order to escape 
liability? The Supreme Court answered that question in the Hepps 
case in a way that seems to establish that a great many defamation 
plaintiffs must now prove, as a constitutionally-required element of 
their prima facie cases, that the defamatory publication was false.136 
The scope of the Hepps rule is not easy to discern. At least one 
significant application of the rule had been a plausible inference from 
the Court's decision in Sullivan. Thus, one could have argued that in 
those cases that were subject to the first Sullivan rule, requiring a 
public official or a public figure plaintiff to prove New York Times 
actual malice, the plaintiff also carried a burden to prove the falsity of 
the defamatory material.137 Assume for purposes of this discussion 
134. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). 
135. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 323-38. 
136. Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986) ("the common 
law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-
must ... fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the bur-
den of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages"). 
137. The Sullivan opinion discussed the inadequacy of a state law of defamation that 
allows the defendant to escape liability if the defendant meets the burden of 
proving that the defamatory statements were true. New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). The Court tied this rejection of the treatment of 
truth as a defense into its concern about the "self-censorship" that potential de-
fendants would exercise, leading to the avoidance of publishing some true state-
ments as to the truth of which the speaker is unwilling to bear the risk of 
nonpersuasion. Id. The Sullivan opinion is, nevertheless, subject to a reading 
under which it is clear that liability for true defamatory statements would be 
constitutionally impermissible, but under which it would also be possible that 
once a plaintiff has established that the defendant's conduct displayed reckless 
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that the only room for doubt about the applicability of a requirement 
that the plaintiff must prove falsity exists in connection with those 
cases to which the Sullivan rule does not apply.1as It is still necessary 
to determine whether the Hepps rule is a blanket requirement that 
applies to all defamation cases or whether the rule applies to some 
narrower subset of non-Sullivan cases. It is with regard to this deter-
mination that the Hepps decision itself is particularly unhelpful. 
Coming less than a year after the Greenmoss Builders decision,139 
the Court's decision in Hepps should have taken note of an apparent 
shift in the terms of analysis of the private plaintiff defamation action. 
The previous year's decision had apparently moved the "matter of 
public concern" criterion to the heart of constitutional protection, at 
least in private plaintiff defamation actions,140 if not, indeed, in defa-
mation actions brought by public persons as well.141 The focus on the 
media or nonmedia status of the defendant142 appeared to have been 
moved to the periphery, if not rendered completely irrelevant to the 
level of constitutional protection. However, in the Hepps decision, 
written by one of the three Justices comprising the Greenmoss Build-
ers plurality,143 the Court limited its ruling on the proof of falsity re-
quirement to defamation cases in which a plaintiff sues a media 
defendant.144 Because Justices Brennan and Blackmun, both of 
disregard of the truth or falsity of the statements, the defendant would then 
either bear a burden of production of evidence of truth, or bear a burden of per-
suasion as to the truth of the statements. 
138. This does seem to be the assumption under which Justice O'Connor operated in 
writing the decision for the Court in Hepps. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (1986) ("a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity 
of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation"). In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disputes the contention that the Court had 
previously decided that question even as to public figure plaintiffs. See Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 n.10 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
139. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
140. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying 
text. 
141. The basis for this suggestion is the statement in Justice Powell's opinion that 
"every ... case in which this Court has found constitutional limits to state defa-
mation laws ... involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern." 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2944 (1985) 
(emphasis added). The possibility, thus, exists that if the Court is presented with 
a public figure or public official case that does not involve expression on a matter 
of public concern, the Court would refuse to place a constitutional limit on the 
state defamation law. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
143. Justice O'Connor, who authored the opinion for the Court in Hepps, joined with 
Justices Rehnquist and Powell to form the plurality in Greenmoss Builders. 
144. "[A] private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at 
issue is false before recovering damages for defamation/rom a media defendant." 
Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps,106 S. Ct.1558,1564 (1986) (emphasis ad-
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whom dissented in Greenmoss Builders but concurred in Hepps, re-
jected any limitation on the scope of the proof of falsity rule to media 
defendants,145 one is left with the following complicated and confusing 
line-up on the potentially critical question of the continued relevance 
of the defendant's media or nonmedia status in private plaintiff cases. 
Two of the Justices (Brennan and Blackmun) take the position that 
media status is not relevant either in Greenmoss Builders146 or in 
Hepps.147 Two of the Justices explicitly14S (Stevens) or implicitly149 
(Rehnquist) took the position that media status was irrelevant in 
Greenmoss Builders and did not indicate the relevance of that factor 
in their Hepps dissent. Two of the Justices (Burger and White) con-
curred in the judgment in Greenmoss Builders,1so and dissented in 
Hepps151 with no statement about media status. In his Greenmoss 
Builders opinion, Justice White did, however, express his agreement 
with Justice Brennan's position on the issue.1s2 The remaining three 
Justices have the most puzzling record on the issue. Justices Powell 
and O'Connor implicitly rejected the relevance of nonmedia status in 
Greenmoss Builders,1sa but reserved the question of the relevance of 
such status in Hepps.l54 Justice Marshall joined O'Connor and Powell 
in Hepps,1ss but had also joined Brennan's dissent in Greenmoss 
Builders156 which explicitly declared the irrelevance of the media sta-
ded). The Court also noted that it was not necessary to "consider what standards 
would apply if the plaintiff sues a norunedia defendant." Id. at 1565 n.4. 
145. Id. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring) (adhering to the view expressed in Green-
moss Builders that the media/norunedia status distinction is not supported by the 
first amendment). 
146. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2957 (1985). 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in the dissent. 
147. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565-66 (1986). Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun joined in a concurring opinion. 
148. Justice Stevens joined the dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2957 (1985). 
149. Justice Rehnquist joined the plurality opinion written by Justice Powell, in 
which the state supreme court's reliance on the norunedia status of the defendant 
was rejected in favor of a test based on the "public concern" nature of the com-
munication. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 
(1985). 
150. Id. at 2948 (Burger, J., concurring in judgment) (White, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
151. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined the dissenting opinion written by 
Justice Stevens. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 
(1986). 
152. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2953 (1985). 
153. I d. at 2942 (affirming the state court judgment on grounds other than the media/ 
norunedia status distinction upon which the state supreme court had relied). Jus-
tice O'Connor joined the plurality opinion written by Justice Powell. 
154. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986). Justice 
Powell joined the opinion for the Court written by Justice O'Connor. 
155. Id. at 1559 (joining the opinion written by Justice O'Connor). 
156. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greerunoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2954 (1985). 
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tus factor. One tabulation of these positions might support the conclu-
sion that the entire Court, or at least a majority of the Court, believes 
that media status is not relevant to the scope of the Gertz rules regard-
ing presumed damages and punitive damages157 and that a different 
majority believes that media status is not relevant to the scope of the 
Hepps rule on proof of falsity.1ss A different tabulation might, how-
ever, lead to the conclusion that although a majority of the Court has 
expressly identified the media status factor as irrelevant to the appli-
cability of the second and third Gertz rules,159 a majority would con-
tinue to reserve the option of employing that factor in the resolution 
of other questions about the scope of constitutional restrictions on def-
amation law.1so 
A final note of uncertainty about the scope of the Hepps rule is 
sounded by the Court's reservation of the question whether the rule 
would apply in a case in which the plaintiff was unable to hold the 
defendant liable for damages.l61 The suggestion that less constitu-
tional protection is afforded to those who are exposed to liability other 
than monetary damages would seem to be unwarranted as a matter of 
sound policy.1s2 Nevertheless, despite its unpersuasiveness as a way of 
distinguishing among different types of defamation actions, perhaps 
this expression of doubt concerning the scope of constitutional protec-
tion from nonmonetary liability can be used to clear up some of the 
media/nonmedia confusion generated in the Court's opinions or, at 
least, to provide a greater understanding of the source of the confu-
sion. One can draw from the cases to date the conclusion that the 
157. The clearest majority that expressly stated the irrelevance of this factor in Green-
moss Builders would consist of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, 
and White. Justices Powell and O'Connor could be added to this majority as a 
result of the inferences to be drawn from their rejection of the grounds for the 
state court judgment. 
158. The majority would consist of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, as a result of 
their express statements, and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, White, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger, as a result of the implications of the dissenting opinion written by 
Justice Stevens. 
159. See supra note 157. 
160. Only Justice Marshall can be reliably associated with this split approach to the 
relevance of the distinction to the two different issues in Greenmoss Builders and 
Hepps. The majority hypothesized in the text could consist of the three members 
of the Court who explicitly stated their reservations in Hepps (Justices Powell, 
O'Connor and Marshall), as well as the four who joined the dissent written by 
Justice Stevens (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and 
White). The resignation of Chief Justice Burger and his replacement by Justice 
Scalia introduce another wild card that must be considered when playing the fu-
ture line-up prediction game. 
161. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986) ("We also 
have no occasion to consider ... what standards would apply ... if a State were to 
provide a plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment that declared the 
speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to liability for damages.") 
162. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text. 
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greatest constitutional concern is being displayed for (1) media de-
fendants, (2) held liable for damages, (3) for publishing matters of 
public concern,l63 and that a case presenting only onel64 or twol65 of 
these three factors calls for less constitutional intrusion into the state 
choice about how to structure the common law remedy. One of the 
drawbacks of a case-by-case development of the constitutional frame-
work for defamation is the difficulty of discerning the relationship 
among such multiple variables when particular combinations have not 
yet been before the Court.l66 
THE LIBERTY LOBBY RULE: The Availability of Summary 
Judgment for the Defendant 
The ability to avoid the expense and risk involved in a trial on the 
merits of a defamation claim is a highly prized part of the constitu-
tional protection package sought by defamation defendants since the 
Sullivan decision.l67 Doubts about the existence of constitutional rea-
sons for granting summary judgment in defamation cases were created 
by a reference in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire.l6B Reversing a summary judgment for the defendants in 
that case, the Court noted that it was "constrained to express some 
doubt about the so-called 'rule' " favoring summary judgmentl69 in 
cases to which the first Sullivan rule applied. Interpreting the first 
Sullivan rule as calling into question a defendant's "state of mind," 
the Court stated that such an issue "does not readily lend itself to 
summary disposition."l70 Because the lower courts had erred in the 
initial determination that the first Sullivan rule actually applied to 
the case,l71 the Supreme Court was not faced with the question of "the 
propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary 
163. This category would include both the paradigm public official plaintiff case of 
Sullivan and the private plaintiff case such as Gertz. 
164. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) 
{apparent nonmedia defendant held liable for damages for publication of matter 
that was not of public concern). 
165. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (action for damages against 
nonmedia defendants who published defamatory communication about a matter 
of public concern). 
166. Thus, we are left with such provocative footnotes suggesting different treatment 
for a case presenting a different combination of variables as the one in Hepps, 106 
S. Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986), see supra note 144, or the one in Hutchinson, 443 U.S. 
111, 133 n.16 (1979), see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
167. See, e.g., Abrams, Summary Judgment in Libel Actions, in LIBEL LITIGATION 
1986, supra note 2, at 291; Kovner, Motion for Summary Judgment, in NEW YORK 
TIMEs V. SULLIVAN: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 303 (R. Winfield ed. 1984). 
168. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 134-36. 
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judgment."l72 
Any pall on the use of summary judgment cast by the Hutchinson 
footnote was at least partially lifted by the latest of the Supreme 
Court decisions on defamation, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.l73 Os-
tensibly viewing the case as one calling for a fairly routine decision 
regarding procedural matters, rather than as a case that called for 
some special treatment because of its first amendment overtones,l74 
the Court held that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of "actual malice," a court must evaluate the plaintiff's evi-
dence on that issue according to the clear and convincing evidence 
standard identified earlier as the second Sullivan rule.l75 The reser-
vations that had earlier been expressed in the Hutchinson footnote 
about the propriety of granting summary judgment on a matter that 
involves a determination of the state of mind of the party moving for 
judgmentl76 were cavalierly dismissed as "simply an acknowledge-
ment of [a] general reluctance 'to grant special procedural protections 
to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the consti-
tutional protections embodied in the substantive laws.' "177 
The Liberty Lobby rule has a certain superficial logic to it. After 
all, one might argue, if the constitutionally required rules demand 
both a heightened standard of faultl78 and a heightened standard of 
proof,l79 then one can expect it to be unlikely that public official and 
public figure defamation plaintiffs would be able to overcome the ob-
stacles to recovery. When the evidence fails to reveal a basis for con-
cluding that a plaintiff has surmounted the constitutional barriers, the 
defendant and the legal system, as a whole, benefit from an early dis-
position of the case in a manner that relieves some of the expense and 
risk attached to litigation. The only possible complaint that a plaintiff 
might have, according to a somewhat more extreme version of this 
view, would be the elimination of the claim before the plaintiff has 
been able to achieve whatever nefarious "anti-media" goal that consti-
tuted the real reason for bringing the action. The protection of defa-
mation defendants that is provided by the Liberty Lobby rule would 
172. Id. at 120 n.9. 
173. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). 
174. See id. at 2515 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding today is not, of 
course, confined in its application to First Amendment cases .... Moreover, the 
Court's holding is not limited to those cases in which the evidentiary standard is 
'heightened,' i.e., those in which a plaintiff must prove his case by more than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence."). 
175. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
176. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979). See supra notes 168-72 and 
accompanying text. 
177. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 n.7 (1986). 
178. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
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thus fit squarely into the rationale underlying the Sullivan decision 
and its various progeny. 
This fairly plausible account of the Liberty Lobby rule should not 
detract attention away from some serious concerns that ought to be 
raised by the decision. A rule giving some sort of sanction to a wide-
spread use of summary judgment in defamation caseslSO may, in fact, 
be symptomatic of the larger problems created by the Sullivan deci-
sion as extended by later cases. One of the most significant of those 
problems is the difficulty lawyers and judges seem to have in under-
standing and explaining what are, after all, fairly simple legal con-
cepts.lSl The confusion over the meaning of "actual malice" and 
"clear and convincing evidence," for example, can be avoided, or at 
least kept out of the public view, if defamation cases are disposed of 
prior to any consideration by a jury. Rather than, or in addition to, 
seeing the Liberty Lobby rule as an expression of hostility or distrust 
directed at the jury in first amendment or defamation cases, the rule 
might instead be seen as a covert expression of despair at the ability of 
the legal system to translate the series of constitutional protections 
developed in Sullivan and its progeny into a workable body of rules. 
Viewed in this way, the problem might be seen to lie not so much in 
the operation of the system as it does in the content of the rules that 
the system is called upon to apply.1s2 
THE KEETON/JONES RULES: Personal Jurisdiction 
Over the Defendant 
Among the most technical procedural rules that can affect the 
course of ordinary litigation are the considerations that go into the 
assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant. The multistate operations 
and distribution of a good deal of contemporary publishing serve to 
place many defamation actions within the potential scope of the due 
process limitations developed over the last forty years regarding the 
180. Surely, it is realistic to expect that the Liberty Lobby decision will be read as 
having special relevance to defamation claims rather than as a wholesale encour-
agement of summary judgment in all federal district court litigation. 
181. See supra note 102. 
182. This interpretation of the Liberty Lobby rule could be found to be in accord with 
the views expressed in Justice White's separate opinion in Greenmoss Builders 
suggesting that the Supreme Court had made an initial misstep in the Sullivan 
case. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2949-
54 (1985). The congruence between those views and this critique of the Liberty 
Lobby case would have been easier to maintain if Justice White had not been the 
author of the Liberty Lobby opinion for the Court! The longer one studies the 
Supreme Court's tortured series of decisions on defamation, the more one is re-
minded of Casey Stengel's question, "Can't anybody play this here game?" R. 
CREAMER, STENGEL: His LIFE AND TIMEs 299 (1984). 
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assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.183 In 
two cases decided the same day in 1984,184 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed some of the more troublesome jurisdictional issues that can 
arise in a defamation case. The Court concluded that the procedural 
concepts developed for use in normal litigation provided sufficient 
protection for defamation defendants, without a need for any special 
constitutional limitations other than the substantive rules already de-
rived from the first amendment for such actions. 
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,185 the lower federal courts dis-
missed an action, filed by a New York plaintiff in New Hampshire, on 
the basis of a lack of jurisdiction over the Ohio corporation defend-
ant.1S6 Reversing that judgment, the Supreme Court held that as long 
as sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state 
would support jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, the plaintiff 
would be permitted to take advantage of the forum state's extended 
limitations period and maintain her defamation action in New Hamp-
shire.187 The factor that makes the decision so important is not so 
much the plaintiff's ability to sue in New Hampshire, a state with 
which both the plaintiff and the defendant apparently had very mini-
mal contacts,1ss but rather the ability to assert a claim for all the harm 
that the defamatory publication had caused the plaintiff, both within 
and outside the forum state.189 Stating that the application of such a 
"single publication" rule190 was a matter of substantive law not before 
the Court on the jurisdictional appeal,191 the Court failed to pass on 
the constitutionality of such an extensive potential liability.192 
Calder v. Jones,193 the other defamation jurisdiction case, involved 
a more straightforward application of standard "minimum contacts" 
analysis to a defamation action brought against Florida defendants in 
183. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally J. 
FruEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 123-47 (1985). 
184. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783 (1984). 
185. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
186. Id. at 772. 
187. Id. at 773-74. 
188. The defendant corporation sold 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its magazine in New 
Hampshire each month. The plaintiff worked for a magazine that was also circu-
lated in New Hampshire. Id. at 772. 
189. Id. at 776-80. 
190. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, at 209-13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 577A (1977) ("As to any single publication, ... all damages suffered in all 
jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action"). 
191. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n.9 (1984). 
192. On remand, a federal jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict of two million dollars. 
See Falwell Bests Flynt in Court Cases, The Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1986, at C2, 
col. 3. 
193. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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California by a California plaintiff.194 Relying on findings that the de-
famatory publication had its largest circulation in California195 and 
that the defendants had knowingly caused injury to California resi-
dents,196 the Court refused to complicate the jurisdictional analysis 
any further by interjecting at the jurisdictional stage the first amend-
ment concerns that play such an important role in the substantive law 
of defamation actions.197 
II. TWO SUBSTANTIVE REFORM PROPOSALS 
The constitutional rules outlined above are not sufficiently com-
prehensive to be able to resolve all of the major issues that can affect 
the outcome of defamation litigation. Much of the contemporary law 
of defamation must still be fashioned by state courts and legislatures. 
The dual thesis of this portion of the Article is first, that rather than 
constantly relying on modification and extension of the constitutional 
framework of defamation law, attention should be given to the reform 
of the state tort law of defamation within the existing constitutional 
parameters outlined above. Second, tort reform along these lines can 
go far toward accommodating the diverse and potentially conflicting 
interests of defamation plaintiffs, defendants, and the public. 
The reforms described in the remainder of this Article are con-
strained by the constitutional rules previously set forth. Such an ap-
proach to reform has both positive and negative implications. A 
disadvantage is that this approach accepts as a given some very ques-
tionable constitutional developments of the last two decades. One 
could easily conclude that greater attention ought to be given to chal-
lenging and changing the very constitutional rules that are taken as 
the background against which to offer the tort reform proposals. 
While basically sympathetic to that view, this Article's approach in-
sists on recognizing that a call for reform of the constitutional rules 
regarding defamation is not what is being offered here. As a justifica-
tion for this (temporary) "hands-off" approach to what are admittedly 
eminently criticizable constitutional rules, this Article would simply 
offer the suggestion that the reforms described below will be able to 
194. Because the action was brought in the plaintiff's state of domicile, the problem 
that existed in the Keeton case, that the plaintiff would be asserting a claim for 
damages for harm that had occurred primarily somewhere other than the forum 
state, was not presented in Jones. 
195. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984). 
196. Id. at 789-91. 
197. Id. at 790 ("We also reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter 
into the jurisdictional analysis. The infusion of such considerations would need-
lessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry .... Moreover, the potential chill 
on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation ac-
tions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the sub-
stantive law governing such suits."). 
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be put into effect without any need to persuade a majority of the 
Supreme Court of the necessity either to undo what it has done or to 
do more than it has already done. These reform proposals, nonconsti-
tutional in nature, can be implemented at once and free from constitu-
tional considerations.19B 
This section of the Article describes two significant and much 
needed reforms of the substantive law of defamation. The first propo-
sal calls for an absolute privilege for defamatory communications con-
cerning government, a position much more protective of speech and 
the press than is currently afforded by the constitutional law of defa-
mation. The second proposal involves a restructuring of the prima 
facie defamation case in order to raise the emotional harm element to 
an equal footing with the reputational harm component that has tradi-
tionally been at the core of the defamation action. The adoption of 
this latter proposal has the distinct advantage of bringing within the 
scope of the currently recognized constitutional protections all of the 
various ostensibly non-defamation actions that might be asserted in an 
attempt to evade the constitutional rules that have been developed for 
the law of defamation. At the same time it acknowledges the occur-
rence of what has arguably been a major shift in the underlying social 
rationale for the defamation action. 
A. An Immunity for Speech About Government 
Under the current constitutional law of defamation, one who 
makes a defamatory criticism of government can be subject to liability 
if a public official plaintiff is able to establish that the defamatory 
statement was false,l99 was "of and concerning" the plaintiff,200 and 
was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth 
198. The critical views expressed by Justice White in his Greenmoss Builders concur-
ring opinion point toward legislative action as the source of a remedy for some of 
the mistakes he perceives as having been made over the period in which the 
Supreme Court has been imposing constitutional restrictions on the law of defa-
mation. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 
2953 (1985). Even his thoughts about reform seem, however, to depend on a re-
laxation or a reversal of some of the stands taken by the Court in Sullivan and 
Gertz. The reform proposals introduced here require no change in the constitu-
tional rules previously described. Starting with the assumption that those rules 
are at least temporarily rather firmly in place, it is believed that the adoption of 
these reform proposals will complement the constitutional framework and pro-
vide a more comprehensive and more equitable structure for the law of 
defamation. 
199. See supra notes 134-66 and accompanying text (discussion of the Hepps rule re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the defamatory communication). 
200. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussion of the fourth Sullivan 
rule making the colloquim element a matter of constitutional concern in a defa-
mation action brought by a public official for criticism of official conduct). 
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or falsity.2o1 The rationale for this set of constitutional requirements 
is built on two related premises expressed or implied at various places 
in the body of Supreme Court decisions on the subject: first, false 
statements of fact have no constitutional value,2o2 and second, the line 
separating true statements from false statements is extremely diffi-
cult to locate.203 The Supreme Court was dissatisfied with a common 
law of defamation that allowed the defendant to be held liable in a 
case in which the judicial fact finder determined nothing more than 
that the defamatory statement was on the falsehood side of the line.2o4 
Therefore, the Court adopted a set of fault-as-to-falsity and burden of 
proof rules that shifted the focus of judicial inquiry away from locat-
ing the truth/falsity dividing line to discerning the defendant's state of 
mind regarding the truthfulness of the statement published.2os 
Implicit in the rules developed in Sullivan and the subsequent de-
cisions is the assumption that the risk of error in making the determi-
nations relevant to the new constitutional rules is lower than the risk 
of error in making the true/false determination under the common 
law rules.2os Operating from this premise, the Supreme Court has 
been able to persuade itself that the Sullivan rules create a ''breathing 
space" for the publication of statements that, in fact, are on the true 
side of the dividing line, but which might not have been published if 
the defendant was threatened with liability should a fact finder err 
and decide that the statements were false.207 
Correlative with this view of the world under the Sullivan rules 
should be a recognition that statements that are, in fact, false may not 
be deterred and that the ''breathing space" extends over to an area on 
201. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text (discussion of the first Sullivan rule 
requiring the public official plaintiff to prove New York Times actual malice). 
202. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
203. Id. at 340-41; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,278-79 (1964). See also 
Schauer, supra note 124. 
204. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1964). 
205. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text (discussion of first Sullivan rule) 
and notes 74-87 and accompanying text (discussion of first Gertz rule). The loca-
tion of the dividing line between truth and falsity is still a matter of some impor-
tance, given the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the defamatory 
statements are false. See supra notes 134-66 and accompanying text (discussion of 
the Hepps rule). 
206. The risks might be thought to be lower in two different senses. First, the rate of 
false positive errors, i.e., erroneous decision in favor of liability, might be lower 
for fault determinations than for true/false decisions. Second, the consequences 
of an erroneous decision on a fault issue might be considered less serious than an 
erroneous decision regarding truth or falsity. Both notions of risk reflect a view 
about the institutional competence of the judicial decisionmaking process that 
considers fault determinations as more properly within the mainstreanl of judi-
cial forum activity than would be a judicial decision embodying what is, in effect, 
a governmental decree on truth or falsity. 
207. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-83 (1964). 
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the false side of the line as well. The conclusion that must then fol-
low, however reluctantly it might be expressed, is that publishers of 
these false statements, which have no constitutional value, may never-
theless successfully claim constitutional protection as long as their 
state of mind is subsequently determined to have constituted a lower 
level of fault-as-to-falsity than that required by the first Sullivan rule. 
This result, one is then told, is the price one pays in order to receive 
the benefit of a freer attitude toward publication of the now-undeter-
red true statements.2os 
A less satisfactory way of analyzing the problem and devising a so-
lution would be hard to imagine. The Sullivan world view rests on 
premises of the most dubious validity and with the most dangerous 
implications. Against what standard, for example, is one to determine 
truth or falsity in any but the simplest instances of simple factual re-
portage? Why do falsehoods necessarily have no constitutional 
value?209 What business does the government have making official 
decisions through its judicial agencies about the truth or falsity of alle-
gations about itself or its officials?210 The time has come to cast aside 
reliance on this Sullivan world view as the sole or the major rationale 
on which to build a law of defamation, recognizing that it has failed to 
do the job it was meant to do211 and turn instead to a tort law solution 
that establishes an absolute immunity from civil litigation for speech 
about government. 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the state court judgment en-
tered for the plaintiff in the Sullivan case was the similarity between 
the tort action for defamation and the seditious libel prosecution for 
derogatory or critical speech about government.212 When government 
208. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974). 
209. One could argue that even deliberate falsehoods have a very real constitutional 
value by provoking critical inquiry and rebuttal of the allegations. Rather than 
seeing falsehoods as inevitably harmful pollutants in "the stream of information 
about public officials and public affairs,'' Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2951 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment), one 
might instead view falsehoods as catalyst agents triggering desirable or useful 
reactions from those who contribute to or draw from that "information stream." 
210. The view that the soundest philosophical foundation for a concept of protection of 
freedom of speech can be built on an awareness of the risks attendant upon gov-
ernmental decisionmaking in this area is expressed in F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
211. More extensive study needs to be given to the questions of (1) whether there has 
been a recent increase in the number of defamation actions brought by govern-
mental officials of even the lower levels of government against their critics, and 
(2) whether the risk of liability and the expense of defending such claims acts as a 
deterrent to private citizen participation in, and criticism of, local governmental 
process. Should either or both of those inquiries produce a positive answer, one 
must recognize that the existing constitutional rules were intended to avoid pre-
cisely these problems. 
212. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78 (1964). 
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has the ability to employ its criminal system against its critics, speech 
critical of that government is undoubtedly deterred. Two aspects of 
the seditious libel analogy need to be acknowledged, however, as cast-
ing some doubt on the effectiveness of the constitutional rules the 
Supreme Court adopted to reduce the risk that defamation actions 
may deter speech critical of government. First, there is essentially 
nothing about true speech critical of government that makes it less 
harmful to the government or its officials than false speech.2I3 In-
deed, as was sometimes said about defamation, the truer the criticism, 
the more harmful the effect.214 A defamation rule that relies on the 
analogy to rejecting seditious libel as a legitimate governmental re-
sponse to critical speech would thus have no logical basis for discrimi-
nating between true and false statements contained in the critical 
commentary. The set of constitutional fault-as-to-falsity rules estab-
lished by the Supreme Court would not appear to be very well attuned 
to the underlying problem of the risks of government taking legal ac-
tion against critical speech. The fault-as-to-falsity rules seem to de-
pend instead on a related but nonetheless distinct rationale, the 
desirability of a well-informed, i.e., accurately informed, citizenry.2I5 
The second observation that can be drawn from a consideration of 
the seditious libel analogy that underlies much of the concern for the 
implications of liability in the Sullivan context would point to the 
deeply conservative nature of the response embodied in the Supreme 
Court's rejection of seditious libel or its civil analogue as a legitimate 
tool of government. Perhaps the fragility of a government is too easily 
forgotten in this country since we have managed to escape the turbu-
lence and unrest that causes governments to fall with predictable reg-
ularity in much of the rest of the world. It is certainly beyond the 
scope of this Article to attempt to offer explanations for the remarka-
ble stability of the American governmental process. Nonetheless, it is 
at least possible that one of the techniques that is successfully used to 
diffuse the revolutionary spirit in this country is not only the removal 
of limits on what government can do for those who are most likely to 
be critical2I6 but, also, the effect of the imposition of limits on what 
213. The only President of the United States to resign his office was faced with a wide- · 
spread publication of and public fascination with what were, after all, true state-
ments about his conduct. 
214. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, § 64, at 324-25. 
215. See, e.g., Justice White's Greenmoss Builders comments about pollution of the 
stream of information, supra note 209, and Justice Rehnquist's comments about 
the state interest in "discourag(ing] the deception of its citizens." Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). 
216. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the institution of the "New 
Deal" relief measures at the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt administration 
and the eventual breakdown of the Supreme Court's opposition to many of those 
measures. 
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government can do to its critics. Viewed from this perspective, Sulli-
van emerges as a decision that was at least as much protective of the 
fundamental stability of the existing government structures as it was 
of the free speech interests of the defamation defendants in that case. 
But viewed from this perspective, it is also true that the particular 
fault-as-to-falsity solution adopted by the Supreme Court is less than 
compelling as a way of implementing the protective rationale.217 
These observations lead to the conclusion that the Sullivan rules 
placing fault-as-to-falsity at the core of the defamation case are an in-
adequate response to the risk that government might use a defamation 
action as a means of deterring speech that is critical of government. In 
the first place, the critic of government who becomes a defamation 
defendant is still, under the Sullivan rules, subject to the risk of liabil-
ity if the plaintiff is able to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant knew the defamatory communication was false or 
published the communication with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity.21s Furthermore, should the public official plaintiff be able to 
make that showing, the defendant is liable not only for damages that 
compensate for the actual harm that the plaintiff can prove but for 
presumed and punitive damages as well.219 Even if the Court were to 
believe that the actual risk of liability under these circumstances was 
minimal, the risk is nevertheless real. The speech-deterrent effect of 
that risk is compounded by the potentially substantial cost that the 
defendant faces in order to resist the plaintiff's claim.22o Finally, the 
tension that is likely to be produced by an official stifling of criticism 
would not be relieved by the current constitutional rules that subject 
the critic to the risks of liability and the costs of defense that have just 
been described. Indeed, the frustration of being caught in a web of 
217. It is difficult to conceive of the possibility that the difference between negligent 
and reckless publication of the false statements in the New York Times advertise-
ment that was the basis of the Sullivan case is at all significant when deciding 
whether, and if so, to what extent, the advertisement made a legitimate contribu-
tion to the public awareness of the struggle for racial justice in the South. 
218. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text (discussion of first and second Sulli-
van rules). 
219. See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text (discussion of second and third 
Gertz rules). The combination of these two sets of rules provides that every pub-
lic official plaintiff who establishes the basis for the liability of a defendant auto-
matically establishes the constitutional acceptability of the potentially unlimited 
recovery possible under the guise of presumed damages and punitive damages. 
Any limitation of damages would therefore have to be a matter of state tort law. 
220. Although the Liberty Lobby decision may make summary judgment easier to ob-
tain in public plaintiff defamation cases, see supra notes 167-82 and accompanying 
text, the extent of the savings for defendants and for potential defendants re-
mains to be seen. This skepticism is the result of a somewhat jaundiced view of 
the legal profession that suspects that if an advantage is to be gained from delay 
and from running up expenses, some means of doing so will be found regardless 
of the substantive and procedural reforms that are enacted. 
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constitutional litigation rules that can be portrayed as arbitrary or in-
effective may inject a further element of cynicism into the attitude 
displayed by the critic of government who becomes a defamation 
defendant. 
The alternative rationale of the fault-as-to-falsity rules, the idea 
that the citizenry is not well-served by false statements of fact intro-
duced into the public discourse,221 not only fails to rescue the Sullivan 
rules from the objections outlined above but also introduces some ad-
verse consequences of its own. Rather than having the legitimacy and 
value of statements about government officials tested in the "market- . 
place of ideas," the Sullivan rules transfer the test to a judicial forum. 
If all that were at issue in a case of this sort was the fault of the de-
fendant in failing to prevent the publication of the challenged state-
ments, an observer might conclude that, however flawed it is, the 
judicial forum is still the best mechanism we have for determining 
fault. But the Sullivan rules, particularly as supplemented with the 
Hepps rule,222 place into the judicial arena a contest between truth 
and falsity, possibly resulting in the branding of a statement of fact as 
false. Perhaps even more unsatisfactory would be another likely con-
clusion to the effect that the person about whom the statement was 
made has been unable to sustain the bm·den of proving that the state-
ment was false. If one is to take seriously the image of the market-
place of ideas, one is entitled to be extremely skeptical about the 
claims of the judiciary to be competent to act as some sort of Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission for that marketplace. This skepti-
cism is particularly well placed when it is a branch of that same 
government that is putting itself into a definitive position to label as 
false a statement about government. 
The risk of government using defamation actions to suppress criti-
cism may not be the most pressing social issue in today's society, but 
one ought to remember that less than a quarter-century ago this risk 
threatened to impede the progress of the most important social move-
ment in this country's history.22a Whether offered as a means of 
avoiding the abuses of seditious libel or as a filter for constitutionally 
valueless falsehoods, the current panoply of constitutional rules offers 
insufficient protection for the critic of government. 
The only truly adequate protection for criticism of government is 
an absolute privilege to say whatever one wishes about government 
without being called to account in any governmental forum. This priv-
ilege would consist of an absolute immunity from tort liability of any 
sort, whether asserted in an action for damages or in an action that 
seeks some other kind of non-monetary relief, and whether asserted 
221. See supra note 215. 
222. See supra notes 134-66 and accompanying text. 
223. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 26-52. 
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in the context of a defamation claim or under the guise of some other 
tort such as invasion of privacy or the infliction of emotional distress. 
This solution is simple, but it is not cost-free. The proposed immu-
nity does provide a shield from behind which blatant falsehoods can be 
injected into the body politic. Nevertheless, even while recognizing 
that possibility, it can be argued that the immunity is still a valuable 
reform of the current state of affairs, and that its benefits do outweigh 
its costs. Political discourse may become more robust224 if the partici-
pants know in advance that the test of truth or falsity is really going to 
be administered in the public forum where individual citizens will 
make up their own minds, rather than being posed in some judicial 
setting, where an official winner and loser will be declared. In addi-
tion, perhaps there is reason to suspect that the body politic will be-
come more resistant to falsehoods if the responsibility for reaching, 
and for acting on, judgments about the truth or falsity of claims rests 
squarely upon individual citizens.22s 
What seems to be fairly clear from the survey of the current consti-
tutional framework is that the proposed immunity faces a strong up-
hill fight if it is offered as a matter that is compelled by the 
constitutional guaranties of speech and press freedom.22s As stated 
earlier, however, there is no need to resort to the constitution to im-
plement this reform, nor is there any need to persuade the Supreme 
Court to modify any of the existing constitutional rules developed 
over the last twenty-two years. The foundation upon which this re-
form can be built currently exists in the tort law of most of the states 
and is easily adopted as a matter of state law. 
Virtually every state currently recognizes a set of common law 
privileges that attach to certain governmental offices.227 These com-
mon law privileges differ from the constitutional privileges derived 
from the Sullivan case in the way that they focus on the status of the 
defendant. While the Sullivan rules are most clearly attached to the 
public official status of the plaintiff, the common law privilege that is 
relevant to this reform proposal is triggered by the public official sta-
tus of the defendant. Some of these privileges have even been held to 
224. Such discourse is identified by Justice Brennan in Sullivan as the subject of "a 
profound national commitment." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964). 
225. To extend Justice White's "pollutants" image, supra note 211, one might suspect 
that those who are situated downstream in the flow of information could develop 
filtration devices and would acquire an immunity to the harmful effects of the 
false statements. 
226. Justice Black made the unsuccessful argument for such a constitutional absolute 
privilege in the Sullivan case. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
227. See generally L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, §§ 72-75, at 340-416; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-91 (1977). 
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be matters of federal constitutional significance.22s According to these 
privileges, a federal official acting within the scope of his official du-
ties is absolutely privileged to make statements without being sub-
jected to suit for defamation arising out of those statements. The 
more important the office and the more critical the immunity is to the 
unfettered functioning of the officeholder, the more likely it is that 
the privilege will be absolute rather than conditional or qualified.229 
The reform that this Article proposes can be accomplished by the 
simple process of introducing a principle of symmetry of application 
into these privileges attached to governmental offices.2ao Such a prin-
ciple would operate in the following way. Suppose that a private citi-
zen named Doreen makes a statement about a county commissioner 
named Phil, accusing Phil of a conflict of interest in a sale of a certain 
parcel of his property that was subsequently the subject of county 
commission action making the property less valuable than it was prior 
to the sale. As a result of his inside knowledge, Phil was able to sell at 
a higher price than if the buyer had known of the upcoming commis-
sion action. Under the current constitutional regime, Phil can sue 
Doreen for defamation, and can hold Doreen liable for what may be 
unlimited presumed damages and punitive damages if the commis-
sioner is able to (1) prove that the statement is false, and (2) prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that Doreen knew that the statement 
was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of 
the statement.231 However, suppose that Phil had made a comparable 
statement of wrongdoing about Doreen. In this case, if Doreen should 
sue Phil for defamation, the situation would be quite different because 
Phil would be entitled to a privilege by virtue of the governmental 
office he holds.232 This current state of affairs is thus asymmetrical. 
When we introduce the principle of symmetry of application to this 
hypothetical, our initial focus is directed to the status of the plaintiff. 
In this way, the initial step seems to be reminiscent of the current 
constitutional regime.233 However, our inquiry concerning the plain-
tiff's status is not the constitutional question about public or private 
status, it is instead a counterfactual inquiry into the existence and de-
gree of any privilege that the plaintiff would have enjoyed had the 
plaintiff made comparable statements about the defendant. Once it is 
determined that the plaintiff-as-defendant would have enjoyed a privi-
228. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
229. Id. 
230. Justice Black's alternative method of deciding the Sullivan case, supra note 226, 
could be viewed as a constitutional version of the principle proposed in this 
Article. 
231. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 (1977). 
233. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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lege, the principle of symmetry of application simply calls for an ex-
tension of that same privilege to the defendant. 
The principle offered here is both easy to apply and fair in the re-
sults it produces. Further consideration of the Phil versus Doreen hy-
pothetical will illustrate the virtues of this principle. Let us suppose 
that the state tort law in the jurisdiction in which the hypothetical 
arises currently recognizes an absolute privilege for officials in Phil's 
position. Upon a determination of that fact, the defamation lawsuit 
against Doreen is dismissed with prejudice. This dismissal occurs at 
the earliest possible stage and occurs as a result of a decision of a ques-
tion of law, the existence of the privilege that attaches to the commis-
sioner's office.234 The defendant faces none of the potentially 
overwhelming (and thus potentially speech-deterring) costs associated 
with a defense of a defamation action under the current constitutional 
regime, nor does she run a risk that the plaintiff will successfully 
overcome the burdens of production and persuasion that are placed in 
his path by the present constitutional rules. Also significant is the fact 
that an innate sense of fairness is invoked by a disposition of the case 
in a manner and under a rule that treats the two parties as equal play-
ers in the game of political discourse: because the commissioner's 
statements about a citizen are privileged, the citizen's statements 
about the commissioner are likewise privileged. 
The benefits attached to this reform proposal are further illus-
trated by a consideration of what happens when we introduce into 
political discourse the kind of statements that constitute what might 
be deemed noise rather than valuable contributions. Suppose that the 
statement about the county commissioner concerns not some abuse of 
office but rather that he engages in bestiality. This statement would 
appear to have absolutely nothing to do with the conduct of the office 
of county commissioner. The principle of symmetry in application 
provides an efficient, fair, and common-sense solution in this case as 
well. If Phil had made such a statement about the defendant, then the 
statement would have been outside the privilege that the commis-
sioner enjoys as a result of his office.235 In such a case, then, our ini-
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619(1) (1977) ("The court determines 
whether the occasion upon which the defendant published the defamatory matter 
gives rise to a privilege."). 
235. The privilege typically arises upon the occasion of the government official per-
forming some task related to the official position. See generally id. at §§ 585-91. 
Accordingly, a defamatory statement on a purely private matter outside of the 
performance of an official function would be beyond the scope of the absolute 
privilege granted to the public official defendant. 
Note, also, that this reform proposal is not accurately characterized as provid-
ing that no public official may ever sue for defamation. The determinative in-
quiry is much more carefully tailored to the specific ends being promoted than 
would be the case if such a wide-sweeping prohibition were put into place. 
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tial inquiry into the status of the plaintiff results in a determination 
that the plaintiff-as-defendant would not have enjoyed a privilege on 
the occasion of this type of remark, and thus no such privilege would 
be extended to the defendant as a result of the principle of symmetry 
of application. That is not to say that the defendant is necessarily go-
ing to be held liable for the statement. Any number of common law or 
constitutional privileges may come into play.2as But what is signifi-
cant about the proposal offered is that the principle of symmetry in 
application filters out of the judicial system all defamation actions for 
those statements that involve criticism of government, while leaving 
for routine litigation under the usual rules those cases that, although 
they might involve persons who are public officials, do not involve 
criticism of the government. In this way, speech about government is 
much more fully protected than it is under the current constitutional 
rules alone. 
B. An Expansion of the Emotional Harm Component 
of the Defamation Oaim 
The historical function of a defamation action has been to vindicate 
and compensate for injury to the plaintiff's reputation.237 By raising 
the cost of conduct that poses a threat to reputation, the defamation 
action also deters the publication of harmful communications and 
forces the publisher to internalize the costs of the harm inflicted on 
the victim.2as It has probably always been realized that the emotional 
distress produced by the defamatory communication was an element 
of recovery to which a successful plaintiff was entitled.239 However, 
much of the contemporary literature on defamation either assumes or 
argues that the emotional harm component occupies a subsidiary or 
236. See, e.g., id. at §§ 593-98 (occasions on which a conditional privilege may arise as a 
result of the interest served by making the defamatory communication). Both 
the common law conditional privileges and the constitutional privilege embodied 
in the fault-as-to-falsity rules of Sullivan and Gertz differ from the absolute privi-
lege attached to government officials. The protection derived from the condi-
tional privileges can be lost if the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof on the 
relevant issue, such as an abuse of privilege, see id. at §§ 599-605A, or the requisite 
level of fault-as-to-falsity. Absolute privileges, on the other hand, protect the 
privilege holder "not only from civil liability but also from the danger of even an 
unsuccessful civil action." Id. at ch. 25, tit. B, Introductory Note. A defendant 
who does not qualify for an absolute privilege on a particular occasion may still 
attempt to claim a conditional privilege. H the plaintiff fails to overcome that 
privilege, or if the plaintiff fails to prove the constitutionally required fault-as-to-
falsity that applies to the action, the defendant will have escaped liability but will 
not have escaped litigation in the way that is possible if an absolute privilege had 
been applied to the defamation claim. 
237. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 75, § 3, at 4-6. 
238. Id. at 6. 
239. Id. § 4, at 10-13. 
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tangential place in the concept of defamation.240 It is that assumption 
which will be challenged in this section of the Article, on the basis 
that the assumption (1) is insufficiently protective of the victims of 
defamation, and (2) allows too great an opportunity for plaintiffs to 
characterize the claims they are assertin::; in ways that could place the 
defendants outside of the constitutional protections that have grown 
up around the defamation action. To overcome both of these short-
comings, a preferable alternative concept of defamation is one that 
recognizes that emotional harm should be placed on an equal footing 
with reputational injury. 
The first perspective from which to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
an exclusive or primary focus on reputational injury is that of the per-
son about whom defamatory statements are published. Assume that 
on a particular morning, you open your newspaper and read an article 
that includes statements about you that are false and that portray you 
in a way that is likely to make other people think less well of you. 
Whatever one might think about the historical roots of the defamation 
action and the advantages of adhering to ancient concepts of actiona-
ble wrongs, one ought nevertheless to recognize that the predominant 
initial response to that article is going to be personal reaction by the 
person about whom the statements are made, rather than a reputa-
tion-injuring reaction by other people who read the article or are sub-
sequently told about its contents. The personal reaction may run a 
gamut of emotions, including anger, embarrassment, and helplessness. 
The intensity of the reaction may also vary, from minor annoyance to 
disabling withdrawal from contact with others.241 
A number of observations need to be made about this personal re-
action. First, as the scenario illustrates, the plaintiff's reaction is not 
dependent on actual reputational injury. The personal reaction can 
occur before the victim is aware of what sort of response by others the 
defamatory publication has produced. Even if people whom the victim 
knows have a generally supportive response to the victim after they 
become aware of the publication, the initial personal reaction of the 
victim can be quite intense and may be aggravated by a concern about 
future responses to the publication.242 It may be reasonable to assume 
240. See Anderson, supra note 96. 
241. The author of this Article has previously described a classification of injuries at-
tributable to defamatory publications in terms of harms that are (1) personal, 
(2) relational, (3) direct, and ( 4) indirect. See LeBel, The Infliction of Harm 
Through the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 281,311-16 (1985). See also W. TAVOULAREAS, supra note 50 (describ-
ing the personal reaction of the plaintiff in a recent defamation action). 
242. One of the major elements of harm claimed by the plaintiff in the Firestone case 
was emotional distress about the possibility that the plaintiffs son would be ad-
versely affected by the defamatory publication when he grew older. Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461 (1976). 
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that there is a fairly close link between the intensity of some personal 
reaction and the reputational harm that is likely to be actually in-
flicted. However, a careful consideration of the distinct nature of the 
two types of harm reveals that there is no logical necessity that 
reputational harm occur in order for there to be a legitimate claim for 
the kind of personal reaction that can be characterized as emotional 
distress.243 
Second, the plaintiff's reaction is causally linked to conduct by the 
defendant that may be deemed wrongful. This is a crucial factor in 
light of the similarity between the reactions that the victim of a de-
famatory communication might suffer and the emotional reactions 
that a person might have to a wide variety of experiences that have 
absolutely nothing to do with defamation. Dismissing claims of emo-
tional distress with an argument that the victim has to "learn to be 
tougher" or that "we can't provide a legal remedy every time a person 
gets upset" is much less compelling once the causal link between the 
harm and wrongful conduct by the defendant is recognized. What dis-
tinguishes the emotional distress caused by the defendant's wrongful 
conduct from other similar types of emotional distress is precisely the 
factor of the defendant's having exploited the plaintiff for some gain, 
pecuniary or otherwise, to the defendant. At the very least, a society 
is entitled to insist that such exploitation be very persuasively justified 
or that the gain be offset or neutralized by the transfer of compensa-
tory damages from the defendant to the victim.244 
Third, the plaintiffs reaction is one that the legal system has al-
ways treated as a matter suitable for compensation245 and more re-
cently has even treated as the basis of an independent claim for 
relief.246 The elements of an emotional distress claim may resemble 
some or all of the types of harm for which compensatory damages 
have traditionally been awarded in the case of intentional torts.247 In 
243. Firestone establishes the very important proposition that there is no constitu-
tional necessity for such an underlying claim of reputational harm. Id. at 460-61. 
See supra note 93. 
244. The fact of this exploitation could be used to establish that the plaintiff has suf-
fered an injury as a result of the defendant's creation of a non-reciprocal risk of 
harm to the plaintiff and should, therefore, be required to justify the conduct that 
produced the harm. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. 
L. REV. 537 (1972). 
245. Recovery for such emotional distress was traditionally treated as parasitic to the 
establishment of some other basis of liability. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
63, at 54-56. 
246. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (Outrageous Conduct Causing Se-
vere Emotional Distress). 
247. In intentional tort claims, such as assault, false imprisonment, and the form of 
battery which consists of offensive rather than harmful contact, the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover damages despite the lack of physical injury. Although recov-
eries of this sort may be classified as compensatory damages, the absence of physi-
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the last few decades, roughly paralleling the emergence of constitu-
tional restrictions on defamation claims, courts have been recognizing 
that the infliction of emotional distress, without a finding of a more 
traditional tort category on which to append the emotional distress 
recovery, is conduct on which liability may be based.248 The publica-
tion of statements that have the potential for causing injury to the 
reputation of the victim is simply another, and highly foreseeable, way 
in which a defendant can be expected to cause harm of the emotional 
distress type.249 
Viewed from the perspective of the victim of defamatory communi-
cations, a focus on reputational injury is unreasonably narrow in its 
protection of, and compensation for injury to, legitimate personal in-
terests. Recognition of an expanded role for the emotional harm com-
ponent of the defamation claim would, therefore, appear to have as a 
likely effect an expansion of the damages for which defamation de-
fendants might be liable. Such an effect is, however, not a probable 
result of the proposed reform. In the first place, once a plaintiff suc-
cessfully surmounts the obstacles to establishing liability for defama-
tion, the recovery that is allowed under the current set of legal rules 
almost certainly will include an opportunity for an award of substan-
tial damages for what would be recognized as emotional harm.25o Sec-
ond, the only cases in which the proposed reform offers relief to 
someone who would otherwise be barred from any recovery at all 
would be those instances in which proof of actual reputational injury 
is a prerequisite to liability for defamation. While it is true that there 
are such cases,2s1 and thus that the proposed reform would increase 
the incidence of liability, it is also likely that a substantial percentage 
of the plaintiffs who would be unable to prove actual injury to reputa-
tion would be able to base their claim for relief in different terms that 
do not require proof of injury of that sort.252 Thus, while the inci-
dence of liability for defamation may undergo some marginal increase 
as a result of this reform, that increase may not be greater than the 
current incidence of liability for defamation and those similar tort 
cal injury demonstrates that the compensation is actually being made for the non-
physical, or emotional, harm caused by the defendant's conduct. 
248. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, at 54-66, 359-67. 
249. The intentional infliction of emotional distress action recognized by the RESTATE-
MENT, see supra note 246, requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's con-
duct could be characterized as "extreme and outrageous" and that the plaintiff's 
emotional distress be "severe." 
250. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
251. A number of jurisdictions have taken the position that such a prerequisite exists 
as a matter of state law. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 758-59. 
252. The actions most likely to be used to accomplish this result are the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and the invasion of privacy by placing the plaintiff 
before the public in a false light. The false light privacy action is recognized in 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652E (1977). 
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claims that are now not subject to the full range of liability-limiting 
rules regarding defamation. The most likely outcome of the adoption 
of the proposed reform, from the perspective of the victim, is a more 
forthright recognition of the type of harm that the defendant's publi-
cation actually caused. At the same time, the proposed reform is un-
likely to produce any significant increase in the amount or the extent 
of liability that defendants currently face. 
Having downplayed the adverse consequences of this reform pro-
posal on the defendants, the proposal may appear to be offering a re-
form that is only cosmetic or aesthetic in nature. The proposed 
reform may be criticized, that is, on the ground that it is simply a way 
of bringing what one says about the defamation action into a closer 
correspondence to what courts actually do. It is true that one should 
not denigrate that aspect of any reform; such an increased congruity 
between theory and practice is likely to be a healthy phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of the emotional harm component of the 
defamation claim can be seen as a substantial reform proposal when 
viewed from the perspective of a legal system that offers a variety of 
pigeonholes in which to place claims for relief and then attaches sig-
nificant consequences to the pigeonhole that is selected as appropriate. 
From this perspective, the reform proposal serves as a curative mea-
sure for a very real potential abuse of the current tort system in the 
area of liability for speech which causes harm. 
Publication of false statements about the plaintiff can lead to at 
least three separate theories of recovery: defamation, an invasion of 
privacy that consists of placing the plaintiff before the public in a false 
light, and an intentional or negligent infliction of mental or emotional 
distress. Each of these separate theories of recovery has at its core 
some particular interest that is sought to be protected from invasion 
by the defendant's conduct. As described earlier, the interest in repu-
tation is at the core of the defamation action. For the false light pri-
vacy action, the reputational interest gives way to the somewhat more 
ambiguous interest in autonomy or in not being used by a defendant in 
a way that represents the plaintiff to the public as something other 
than what the plaintiff is.2sa The infliction of emotional distress tort 
is, as its rather unimaginative label suggests, intended to protect the 
interest in, if not mental or emotional tranquility or stability, at least 
some undisturbed mental state, an emotional status quo. 
These three theories of recovery display some differences in the 
formulation of key elements. For example, publication in the sense of 
communication to at least one person other than the plaintiff is suffi-
cient to establish a claim for defamation.254 A more widespread com-
253. See id. at comment b; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, at 864-65. 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). 
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munication that could be labelled "publicity" is required for the false 
light invasion of privacy.2ss Furthermore, while a particular level of 
fault-as-to-falsity is required for recovery in many defamation cases 
and most false light privacy cases,256 the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress action has instead an essential element requiring that 
the defendant's conduct be capable of supporting a characterization as 
"extreme and outrageous."257 
Despite these differences in both their protected interests and 
their technical elements, a particular occurrence may serve as the ba-
sis for a claim under all three theories. The ability to characterize a 
particular set of facts in terms of multiple legal theories is normally 
neither unusual nor alarming. A standard physical contact case, for 
example, may very well be characterized as a battery, an assault, a 
false imprisonment, or even an intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Such multiple characterization of a single set of facts may be 
considered simply a result of a tort system that developed out of the 
categorical focus of a common law form-of-action pleading regime. As 
long as the multiple characterization of the claims for relief that can 
arise out of a single set of facts does not also produce multiple recov-
eries for what are essentially the same elements of harm, the phenom-
enon may be considered more inelegant than troubling. 
A mere disapproval of inelegance gives way to a much more serious 
concern about the elimination of important constitutional protections 
when the multiple theories of recovery for harmful speech are consid-
ered. As the first half of this Article shows, the most significant devel-
opment in the defamation field has been nearly a quarter-century 
history of identifying constitutional restrictions on the nature and ex-
tent of liability for defamation. The particular risk that multiple char-
acterization of a set of facts presents in the defamation context is that 
different theories of liability will carry with them either different 
levels of constitutional protection or possibly no constitutional protec-
tion whatsoever. As with any circumstance in which the legal system 
attaches different consequences to essentially the same conduct, a 
publisher in this situation may choose to adopt the safest course of 
conduct and anticipate potential liability under the least protective set 
of legal rules. To the extent that the "self-censorship" rationale of 
255. See id. at § 652D, comment a. 
256. The latest Supreme Court decision directly to address the question held that a 
plaintiff suing for false light invasion of privacy was required to prove New York 
Times actual malice if the action was based on "false reports of matters of public 
interest." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). 
257. Whether New York Times actual malice and "extreme and outrageous conduct" 
are functional equivalents remains an open question. The two concepts are 
treated separately in the recent decision in Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th 
Cir. 1986). 
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Sullivan has validity,2ss the greatest threat under that rationale may 
well be posed by the possibility that characterization of a tort action as 
something other than a defamation action will leave a speaker subject 
to liability under a common law structure that is free from constitu-
tional restraints. 
Once again, the solution is both simple and capable of being 
adopted within the realm of tort law. All that is needed to avoid the 
possible evasion of constitutional protection by an attempt to engage 
in a clever characterization of what the plaintiff is complaining about 
is a recognition that the essence of the defamation action is the pro-
duction of harm by the wrongful publication of falsehood. By raising 
the emotional harm component to a status equal with the reputational 
injury element, this reform proposal assures that whatever constitu-
tional protections have been or will be developed in the context of 
defamation will be extended to a claim for relief under any other label 
or legal theory. 
Two concluding points about this reform may lend further support 
to its adoption. First, the reform suggested here has been accom-
plished in another troublesome area of tort law. Faced with a plethora 
of theories of liability for product-related injuries, a number of states 
have acted to replace the multiple theories with a single "product lia-
bility action."259 Indeed, the move from common law and code plead-
ing to modern rule pleading2GO can be seen as a similar type of reform 
on a broader scale. While neither of these examples were prompted 
by the constitutional considerations in the defamation context, the 
presence of such considerations should serve to highlight the impor-
tance of adopting the reform proposal. 
Second, the reform will have the incidental effect of removing the 
confusion generated by separate tracks of developing constitutional 
restrictions on different tort actions. At the same time that the 
Supreme Court was working out the basic distinctions that were to be 
crucial to the determination of constitutional protection for defama-
tory speech, a different set of criteria was being applied to the false 
light invasion of privacy action.261 Although one might speculate that 
the false light action should be analyzed in terms of contemporary 
constitutional standards developed for defamation rather than in the 
terms used by the Court fifteen or twenty years ago, it is still true that 
the latest Supreme Court words on false light privacy present a differ-
ent constitutional picture than is operative in the defamation con-
text.262 By treating the false light privacy action as simply another 
258. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1963). 
259. See, e.g., .A:LA. CODE § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1986). 
260. FED. R. Crv. P. 2 (there shall be one form of action known as "civil action"). 
261. See supra note 256. 
262. The public/private plaintiff distinction in the law of defamation, see supra notes 
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label to attach to the expanded defamation tort, which would be 
viewed as the production of harm by the wrongful publication of false-
hood, the dual or multiple track development that might otherwise 
create unnecessary confusion is eliminated. 
III. TWO REMEDIAL REFORM PROPOSALS 
Many of the most adverse consequences of the current blend of the 
common law and the constitutional rules for defamation arise not so 
much from the fact of liability being established as from the effect of 
an actual or potential award of monetary damages in substantial, if not 
staggering, amounts. A great deal of attention is currently being given 
to the question of the proper remedies to award in a defamation ac-
tion,263 with much of the reform effort being directed at either the 
drastic reduction or the complete elimination of monetary relief.264 
While reform is almost unquestionably needed in the way that the 
legal system attaches consequences to the fact that a party is found 
liable for defamation, a more complex response is required than is 
found in the proposals currently in vogue. 
This section of the Article offers specific reform proposals concern-
ing presumed damages and punitive damages, the two elements of 
monetary relief that pose the greatest threat to a workable accommo-
dation of the competing interests in the law of defamation. These pro-
posals derive in part from the premise that the previously described 
constitutional limitations on these two elements of damages265 are not 
only inadequate but may, in fact, be almost pernicious in their effects. 
For example, because the recovery of presumed damages is so closely 
29-31, has not yet been extended to the false light privacy action, nor has a prohi-
bition of strict liability similar to the first Gertz rule been incorporated to govern 
false light privacy actions to which the "actual malice" standard does not apply. 
263. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 2, at 236-55. 
264. See, e.g., Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 847 (1986); Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current 
Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1986); Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A 
Critique of Libel and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1983); H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1985). 
H.R. 2846, introduced by Representative Schumer, establishes a declaratory 
judgment action for public officials and public figures to obtain a declaration that 
a media publication or broadcast was false and defamatory. No damages would be 
available in such an action, and an award of plaintiffs attorney's fees would be 
prohibited if the defendant was not at least negligent with regard to the false and 
defamatory character of the communication. If a plaintiff failed to exercise the 
option of bringing the declaratory judgment action, any media defendant could 
elect to designate the action as one for declaratory judgment and, thus, preclude 
both any recovery of monetary damages and any other claim arising out of that 
communication. 
265. See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text (discussion of second and third 
Gertz rules). 
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linked to proof of New York Times actual malice,266 defamation plain-
tiffs have an apparent incentive to introduce the "actual malice" issue 
into cases in which a finding for the plaintiff on that issue would not 
otherwise be a prerequisite to liability. These cases are brought by 
private plaintiffs based on defamatory communications about matters 
of public concern.267 As noted earlier, critics of the current body of 
law often point to the "actual malice" issue as one that is extraordina-
rily difficult for juries, and perhaps even judges, to grasp.26S If this is 
true, a requirement that interjects the issue into a case solely for the 
purpose of determining what types of remedies are appropriate would 
make it more difficult to present the defamation claim in a posture 
that lends itself to accurate and reliable decisionmaking in a judicial 
forum. Furthermore, evidence introduced regarding the aggravated 
wrongdoing of the defendant in order to establish the constitutional 
prerequisite for presumed damages may lead a fact finder to be more 
inclined to raise the level of damages awarded to a plaintiff. For a 
number of reasons, then, the parties and the judicial system might be 
better served by keeping proof of "actual malice" out of cases into 
which the constitutional rules permit or invite, but do not require, its 
introduction. Nevertheless, in keeping with the intent of this Article 
to outline a set of reforms that can be put into place within the current 
constitutional framework,269 the Gertz rules on presumed damages 
and punitive damages will be taken as a given, and the reform propos-
als offered here will operate in conjunction with those rules in an at-
tempt to provide a better accommodation of the competing interests 
that are at stake in a defamation action. 
This section describes two major reforms of the remedial aspects of 
the law of defamation. First, the ready availability of presumed dam-
ages is curtailed by the introduction of a scheme of fairly simple rules 
that transfer to the parties, themselves, the responsibility for deter-
mining the level of monetary damages exposure that will be attached 
to a judgment of liability for defamation. Second, the remedy of puni-
tive damages is restricted to a subset of cases that is narrower than the 
set of fault-as-to-falsity cases in which the Constitution is currently 
held to permit recovery of such damages. 
A. A Series of Options That Can Be Exercised to Reduce Exposure to 
Monetary Damages 
Under the current regime of constitutional rules for defamation, 
266. See irifra notes 270-71. 
267. These are cases to which the first Sullivan rule does not apply. See supra notes 
28-37 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra note 50. See also Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litiga-
tion, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247 (1985); McNulty, supra note 77. 
269. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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any public official or public figure plaintiff who establishes the liabil-
ity of the defendant is entitled to recover presumed damages.270 Fur-
thermore, any private plaintiff who can prove the level of fault-as-to-
falsity that constitutes New York Times actual malice is entitled to 
recover presumed damages.271 Finally, any private plaintiff who can 
prove that the defamatory communication was not about a matter of 
public concern can recover presumed damages without the "actual 
malice" showing.272 
Consideration of this current state of affairs provokes two initial 
observations, one a matter of speculation about what is happening and 
the other a matter of judgment about what should be allowed to hap-
pen. The speculation is that a high percentage of those people who 
actually sue for defamation, as opposed to those who have some com-
plaint about their portrayal in the media but do not sue, have a pretty 
good chance of establishing the constitutional basis for presumed dam-
ages.273 The value judgment with which this Article looks at this state 
of affairs is that, although presumed damages do have an important 
role to play in an action for defamation,274 the ease with which pre-
sumed damages can currently be recovered creates a possibility that 
such damages will be awarded too frequently and in amounts that are 
too large. 
There is, however, another value judgment that this Article brings 
to this examination of the remedial consequences of liability for defa-
mation, one that leads to a rejection of the proposals offered by some 
commentators that the ability to obtain monetary relief be elimi-
nated.275 This other basic hypothesis is that liability for monetary 
270. A public official or a public figure plaintiff must prove New York Times actual 
malice in order to establish the constitutional basis for liability under the first 
Sullivan rule. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text. Satisfying this con-
stitutional burden automatically serves to carry the plaintiff over the only consti-
tutional barrier which the Supreme Court has placed in front of a plaintiff 
seeking to recover presumed damages. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying 
text. The ability to recover presumed damages is, thus, a natural area in which to 
suggest that reform of the common law tort rules will be a beneficial adjunct to 
the existing constitutional rules. 
271. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussion of the second Gertz 
rule). 
272. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
273. The author suspects that the inability to come up with any evidence that is re-
motely likely to satisfy the requirements of the first and second Sullivan rules 
for clear and convincing evidence of New York Times actual malice would keep a 
number of people from litigating. Determination of who does not sue and why 
they do not pursue litigation would be difficult to accomplish, for reasons that are 
obvious. 
274. It is on this point that the author disagrees with such prominent critics of the 
current law of defamation as Professor Anderson, supra note 96, and Professor 
Ashdown, supra note 12. 
275. See supra note 264. 
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damages for defamation both legitimately compensates for real harm 
and reasonably deters the kind of conduct that produces such harm. 
Whether one is pleased with the reality or not, it seems inherently 
undeniable that the threat of monetary liability is what keeps the def-
amation action operating as a constraint on the unjustified production 
of harm. If those who publish defamatory communications were freed 
from that threat, the only checks on abuse would be internal re-
straints, professional standards (in the case of the press), and the de-
terrent effect produced by whatever nonmonetary relief scheme was 
put into place. Given the almost total failure of the first two of those 
alternatives to produce a satisfactory level of claims and litigation,276 
one should be extremely skeptical about the ability of the third option 
to serve as an effective means of keeping the harm caused by the pub-
lication of falsehood to a socially acceptable level. The premises with 
which this Article begins a suggested remedial reform thus include 
the beliefs (1) that money damages drive the tort system to the extent 
that socially unacceptable conduct is deterred and (2) that liability for 
such damages should, therefore, not be totally eliminated. 
Having made a case for monetary relief, however, one can still re-
act negatively to the prospect of a virtually unrestrained award of pre-
sumed damages in those cases in which a plaintiff establishes 
whichever of the prerequisites to recovering such damages is applica-
ble.277 The proposal that is offered here, which is a modified and ex-
tended version of an idea the author has previously sketched out,278 
would reduce the financial impact of a judgment of liability for defa-
mation provided that the parties exercise a series of options to promote 
as fully as possible an accommodation of the various interests that 
have come into conflict. 
OPTION NUMBER ONE: The Attempt to Secure Private Redress 
A fundamental premise of much of today's tort litigation assigns a 
higher degree of desirability to the private settlement of disputes than 
to the costly and often protracted resort to the legal system.279 Draw-
ing on that premise, the first option in this reform proposal seeks to 
channel disputes about the publication of defamatory falsehoods into a 
276. The media are unable to agree on national standards of conduct or on a body to 
develop and enforce such standards. Within some media enterprises, there cur-
rently exists a practice of deliberately not developing standards, apparently out of 
some warped notion that the mere existence of such standards makes the enter-
prise more vulnerable in the event of litigation, given the ease with which it can 
be proved that the standards were violated. 
277. The prerequisites are: (1) proof of New York Times actual malice, or (2) proof 
that the defamatory statements do not involve a matter of public concern. See 
supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text. 
278. See LeBel, supra note 96, at 788-90; LeBel, supra note 241, at 330-31. 
279. See AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 6, at 4-209 to -213. 
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private resolution that is at least minimally satisfactory to the rele-
vant parties. Because the initiative for seeking such a private redress 
of the grievance more likely than not rests on the person who claims 
to have been injured by the publication, the first option in this reform 
proposal lies with the potential plaintiff. As an initial option, then, 
the plaintiff should be required within a very short time of learning 
about the communication, first, to notify the publisher of the allegedly 
false and defamatory character of the publication, and second, to re-
quest an opportunity to discuss the matter with someone who has the 
authority to decide to retract or correct the communication. 
No more elaborate requirement than this dual responsibility is 
placed on the plaintiff at this stage of the dispute because of what are 
perceived to be serious disadvantages that flow from imposing sub-
stantial burdens on the plaintiff at this preliminary, immediate post-
publication point. The most likely candidate for an additional require-
ment to impose on the plaintiff at this stage would have been an obli-
gation to come forward with evidence of the falsity of the published 
communication. This requirement at this stage would, however, have 
the undesirable consequence of turning the initial contact into an ad-
versary confrontation over the accuracy of the publication. While 
such a confrontation will likely develop at some point and play an im-
portant role in the settlement process,2so it could easily be considered 
unfair to the plaintiff to introduce that element of the dispute at a 
stage in which the option is to be exercised by the plaintiff who was, 
after all, not responsible for introducing the defamatory publication 
into the public forum. Requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of 
falsity at this stage might also serve to delay the initial contact be-
tween the parties beyond a point at which the harm could easily and 
effectively be reduced or eliminated. Postponing a confrontation over 
the accuracy of the publication may also put the parties in a better 
emotional condition to work out some agreement over future steps. 
Requiring the plaintiff at this initial contact to prove the communica-
tion false may trigger both a defensive attitude on the part of the pub-
lisher and a hostile attitude on the part of the potential plaintiff, 
turning this preliminary stage into little more than a name-calling or 
threat-issuing session. 
The key to the design of this initial option is thus the simplicity of 
the demand upon the plaintiff. Even in this minimal state, the first 
option can be expected to produce some beneficial effects, especially in 
the case in which the defamatory communication is published by a me-
dia enterprise. First, the complaint about the publication will be regis-
tered at a time when some corrective measures may be effective. Such 
280. This is true if for no other reason than that the plaintiff will eventually have to 
sustain a burden of proving the falsity of the defamatory statements. See supra 
notes 134-66 and accompanying text (discussion of the Hepps rule). 
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corrective measures serve not only the interest of the injured party 
but, also, the public interest in keeping the channels of communica-
tion free from defamatory falsehoods. Second, the request to discuss 
the matter with someone in authority will raise the level of initial con-
tact from the reporter or low-level editor to the supervisory staff of 
media enterprises. It is at least possible that whatever naturally de-
fensive or rationalizing response one might expect from the author of 
the defamatory piece could be avoided or reduced if the initial direct 
discussion between the parties bypasses the author, who might be un-
willing to admit that some correction is warranted. Third, the initial 
contact option should encourage media enterprises to adopt an institu-
tional process for receiving and handling complaints. The haphazard 
responses that complainants may routinely receive now could be re-
placed by a procedure in which people with some skill in dealing with 
other people are put in the position of representing the publisher in 
dealings with initial complaints about defamatory communications. 
The practical consequences of this option may for these reasons be 
viewed as desirable, but in order to understand how the plaintiff could 
be encouraged to take the simple steps required to complete this op-
tion, it is necessary to decide what legal consequences would follow 
from the plaintiff's failure to exercise this option. It should be noted 
that this option is different from what a number of states have im-
posed as a prerequisite to litigation or to the recovery of certain kinds 
of damages, which is a request for retraction.2s1 While those demands 
for retraction may serve some of the same purposes as this uncompli-
cated notification and request for discussion option, the proposal being 
offered here would not have the effect of acting as a barrier that must 
be crossed before an aggrieved party is allowed to go to court. Under 
the tort reform proposed here, the plaintiff's exercise of this option 
would not in any way act as a prerequisite to filing or maintaining a 
defamation action against the defendant. The request for a retraction 
differs from this initial option in the sense that a retraction demand 
may in practice be nothing more than a preliminary notice of intent to 
sue,2s2 rather than an attempt to open a channel of communication to 
resolve the dispute. The retraction demand may be served on the de-
fendant a considerable period of time after the publication,283 rather 
than as soon as possible after the publication of the defamatory com-
munication.284 The retraction demand may actually entrench the par-
ties more firmly in their adversary positions, rather than act to open 
281. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to -186 (1975). 
282. See id. at § 6-5-186 (in order to preserve a claim for punitive damages, plaintiff 
must make a written demand for public retraction five days before the com-
mencement of the action). 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at § 6-5-185 (in order to limit plaintiff's claim to actual damages, defendant 
must publish retraction within ten days of date of publication). 
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up communication that could lead to some nonlitigation resolution of 
the dispute. Because the reform proposals being offered here are in-
tended to be adopted as part of the tort law of a state, this first option 
to notify and request a discussion with the defendant can be put into 
place either along with a retraction demand requirement or as anal-
ternative to such a requirement. In either situation, the desirable con-
sequences outlined above would more likely be obtained through an 
adoption of this tort reform proposal than through the standard type 
of demand for retraction statute that many states currently have in 
place. 
In keeping with the present focus on remedies rather than on sub-
stantive rights and responsibilities, the proposed reform provides that 
the effect of not making this initial contact with the defendant would 
serve to deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity to recover certain 
kinds or amounts of damages. If the plaintiff does not contact the de-
fendant with this initial notification and request for discussion, any 
recovery by the plaintiff in a subsequent tort action would first be re-
duced by any damages for emotional distress suffered more than one 
week after the date when the plaintiff had an opportunity to exercise 
the option. This somewhat arbitrary time limit represents enough 
time for the plaintiff to learn of the publication and to make the initial 
contact with the publisher.285 
This reform proposal would prevent a plaintiff from obtaining a 
recovery of damages, even for emotional distress that was actually suf-
fered, after the date on which the option should have been exercised. 
In this respect, then, the reform proposal is different from a simple 
restriction of recovery to damages for actual harm suffered by the 
plaintiff. The rationale for this reduction in compensation for emo-
tional distress rests on the idea that the emotional distress element of 
damages may be the type of harm that is most controllable by the 
plaintiff. One major component of this element of harm, which is the 
sense of helplessness at having false statements about oneself put 
before the public, is likely to be substantially reduced if the plaintiff is 
able promptly to engage the publisher in a discussion designed to lead 
to some satisfactory resolution of the dispute. Eliminating recovery 
285. The date when the plaintiff had an opportunity to exercise the option will nor-
mally be the date of publication. The phrasing suggested in the text retains the 
flexibility needed to deal with the situation in which the plaintiff, through no 
fault of his or her own, fails to learn of the publication until some later date. The 
closest analogy to the proposed language would be a "discovery rule" for interpre-
tation of personal injury statutes of limitation, under which the limitations period 
typically begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
critical event, such as injury. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 
371 A.2d 170 (1977). In the defamation case, the option would be triggered when 
the plaintiff knew or should have known about the defendant's publication of the 
defamatory falsehood. 
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for that component of emotional distress still leaves the plaintiff able 
to recover for the emotional distress actually suffered at the time of 
learning about the false and defamatory publication. 
A second consequence of the plaintiffs failure to exercise the noti-
fication and request for discussion option is the elimination of a recov-
ery of damages for any injury to reputation that the plaintiff does not 
prove was actually suffered. This consequence, an elimination of the 
recovery of damages for presumed rather than proven reputational 
harm even though such presumed damages may be constitutionally 
permissible, should take a major share of the windfall element out of 
the defamation recovery. It will also reduce the uncertainty about the 
amount of potential liability that defendants face when presented with 
. the prospect of defamation litigation. The elimination of damages for 
presumed harm to reputation is also a major part of the rationale for 
the second option, described below, which is an option to be exercised 
by the defendant. The reason for attaching this elimination of an ele-
ment of damages as a consequence of the plaintiff's failure to exercise 
the first option is to encourage the plaintiff to make the early notifica-
tion that could give the defendant the opportunity to take advantage 
of the second option. If the plaintiff does fail to exercise the first op-
tion, then the major benefit that the defendant obtains from the de-
fendant's exercise of the second option would automatically occur. 
To summarize this first option, then, within a week of having an 
opportunity to learn that the defendant has published a defamatory 
falsehood about the plaintiff, the plaintiff must (1) notify the defend-
ant of the plaintiff's objection to the published material and (2) re-
quest an opportunity to discuss the matter with someone who has the 
authority to take corrective measures. If the plaintiff fails to exercise 
this option, then the plaintiffs recovery in any defamation action will 
be reduced by (1) any damages for emotional distress suffered after 
the date when the option should have been exercised and (2) any dam-
ages for harm to reputation that has not been proved. 
OPTION NUMBER TWO: The Defendant's Attempt 
to Repair the Damage 
Assuming that the plaintiff exercises the first option and makes 
the initial contact with the defendant, the discussion just concluded 
reveals that the first option places a relatively minimal burden on the 
plaintiff. It requires an obligation simply to notify the defendant that 
the plaintiff objects to statements that the plaintiff considers false and 
defamatory and to request a discussion of the matter with someone 
who is authorized to take steps to satisfy the complaining party. At 
this point in the scenario, the dynamics of the settlement process shift 
the focus to the defendant, the party who has just been notified of an 
allegation that a publication was considered by the plaintiff to be false 
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and defamatory. A major goal of the second option proposed here is 
the creation of an incentive for the defendant to treat the complaint 
received through the plaintiff's exercise of the first option as a matter 
to be considered seriously, and to view the dispute as something to be 
resolved early and inexpensively if it is possible to do so. Accordingly, 
the second option imposes an obligation on the defendant, first, to jus-
tify the publication, and second, when it cannot be justified, to repair 
the harm that the publication might have caused. 
Justification, as the term is used here, simply means satisfying the 
complaining party that the defendant had a substantial basis for pro-
ceeding with the publication of the allegedly false and defamatory 
communication. The plaintiff is not required to establish that the pub-
lication was false, a burden the plaintiff will bear if the matter pro-
ceeds to litigation.286 The justification portion of this second option 
proceeds from the premise that if the defendant has published some-
thing defamatory about the plaintiff, the defendant ought to be re-
quired to undertake some effort to satisfy the plaintiff that the 
communication was true.287 
If the justification effort by the defendant reveals that the defend-
ant had a reasonable basis for believing that the defamatory state-
ments about the plaintiff were true, it is unlikely that the plaintiff 
would be able to establish that the defendant was even negligent with 
regard to the truth or falsity of the communication. A convincing jus-
tification of the defamatory material may, therefore, persuade the po-
tential plaintiff that the chances of proving the constitutionally 
required level of fault-as-to-falsity in the event of litigation are so slim 
that the matter might as well be dropped at this preliminary stage. In 
286. See supra notes 134-66 and accompanying text (discussion of the Hepps rule). 
287. An idea of what is contemplated by the justification effort being proposed here 
can be derived from a consideration of a Virginia migitation of damages statute 
that provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action against the publisher, owner, editor, reporter or em-
ployee of any newspaper, magazine or periodical ... for libel or defama-
tion, ... the defendant ... may introduce in evidence in mitigation of 
general and punitive damages ... but not of actual pecuniary damages, 
all the circumstances of the publication, including the source of the in-
fonnation, its character as affording reasonable ground of reliance, any 
prior publication elsewhere of similar purport, the lack of negligence or 
malice on the part of the defendant, the good faith of the defendant in 
such publication, or that apology or retraction, if any, was made with 
reasonable promptness and fairness .... 
VA. CODE§ 8.01-48 (Repl. Vol.1984) (emphasis added). 
The reform proposed in this Article accelerates the production of this kind of 
evidence from the trial to the time of the defendant's response to the initial com-
plaint registered by the plaintiff, with the idea that a trial might thereby be 
avoided. A version of this kind of reform proposal has recently been offered by 
Ronald Dworkin. See Dworkin, The Press on Trial, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb. 26, 
1987 at 27, 36-37. 
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this way, some defamation claims may be screened out before they 
have a chance to proceed to litigation. 
Should the plaintiff not be deterred from litigating, even after the 
defendant's effort at justification, the court before which the claim is 
pending should entertain at an early stage the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the constitutional fault-as-to-falsity issue. The 
recent Liberty Lobby decision, apparently favoring summary judg-
ment in defamation cases, depended on a conjunction of the aggra-
vated level of fault and the higher standard of proof required in public 
person plaintiff cases subject to the first and second Sullivan rules.2ss 
As a matter of tort law, states could decide to have their courts give 
early and careful attention to the evidence offered by way of justifica-
tion in any case in which the Constitution was held to require some 
level of fault-as-to-falsity. A ruling in a defendant's favor on this issue 
would serve to remove the claim from the litigation system at a pre-
liminary stage. A ruling against the defendant would not mean that 
the defendant was automatically liable, but by indicating the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to proceed to trial on what may be the critical 
constitutional issue, the preliminary ruling for the plaintiff would be 
likely to make it easier to achieve a settlement between the parties. 
If the defendant's effort at justification fails to demonstrate a legit-
imate basis for publication of the defamatory communication about 
the plaintiff, the second part of this option would require the defend-
ant to attempt to repair the harm that has been, or might be, caused by 
the publication.289 In some circumstances, a simple retraction may be 
sufficient to repair the actual and potential harm,290 but the repair 
attempt portion of this option has a different conceptual basis than a 
retraction requirement. The repair attempt option recognizes that the 
publication has a capacity to inflict both reputational and emotional 
288. See supra notes 167-82 and accompanying text (discussion of the Liberty Lobby 
rule). 
289. The major thrust of the repair effort would logically be directed at the reputa-
tional harm caused by the publication. As the text indicates, the repair effort 
should contemplate both past and future reputational injury as harm that can be 
addressed by the defendant. 
290. This would be particularly true in the simple cases of misidentification, in which 
a prompt and prominently displayed clarification should prevent any harm to the 
reputation of the plaintiff. One would expect potential defendants routinely to 
issue satisfactory corrections of blatant errors, but for one reason or another, that 
does not always occur. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that the defendant's con-
duct after being informed of the clearly erroneous publication aggravates the 
problem. Inexplicable behavior of this sort occurred in the Greenmoss Builders 
case, in which the credit reporting agency not only refused to identify for the 
plaintiff those subscribers who had been the recipients of the erroneous report 
but then continued to issue subsequent reports that were arguably just as damag-
ing to the plaintiff as the initial erroneous report. See Larsen, For Their Eyes 
Only, MANHATI'AN, INc., Oct., 1984, at 44. 
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IDJury. While a prompt retraction may be a satisfactory way of allevi-
ating both past and future reputational injury, the retraction by itself 
may do nothing to compensate for the emotional harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff prior to the publication of the retraction. Just as significant, 
however, is the fact that the repair attempt option also recognizes that 
the publication more likely than not has the capacity of providing 
some benefit to the defendant. In the case of media publications, the 
defamatory material would have been subject to some prior favorable 
editorial judgment on its news or entertainment value. The defama-
tory potential of the material may even have made the material a 
more attractive item to publish. For purely private communications, it 
is more plausible to assume that the speaker had some notion of ob-
taining a benefit from the publication than it is to believe that the 
defendant lacked any motive of deriving a benefit. 
Building on these premises about the likely consequences of the 
publication, the repair option combines a requirement that the defend-
ant be prepared to give up what might be seen as unjust enrichment at 
the plaintiff's expense in exchange for the protection of a new tort 
rule that makes the plaintiff forego recovery of damages for two ele-
ments of harm that might have been caused by the publication. The 
defendant's exercise of the option will deprive the plaintiff of the op-
portunity to recover damages, first, for unproven reputational harm, 
and second, for emotional harm alleged to have been suffered after the 
date on which a satisfactory repair effort has been completed. 
The elimination of the unjust enrichment element of the publica-
tion of defamatory material provides the basis for deciding what the 
defendant should have to do in order to complete the repair portion of 
this option. A satisfactory repair would be one in which the defendant 
devotes to the correction of the defamatory potential created by the 
publication an amount of resources roughly equivalent to the re-
sources used to publish the defamatory communication. Viewed in 
conjunction with the first part of this second option,291 an expenditure 
of resources by the defendant in accordance with this option would 
serve to raise the cost of engaging in the unjustified publication of de-
famatory material. 
If the defendant exercises this second option in a satisfactory man-
ner, the tort reform being proposed here would give the defendant the 
benefit of precluding any recovery of damages for presumed harm to 
reputation, as well as any compensatory damages for emotional harm 
suffered after the time at which the corrective measures are taken. 
The plaintiff would still be permitted to recover damages, first, for 
actual injury to reputation that has not been eliminated by the repair 
291. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text (discussion of the justification 
prong of this second opinion). 
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effort undertaken by the defendant, and second, for emotional distress 
suffered from the time of publication until the time of correction. If 
those two elements of damages are sufficiently large to induce the 
plaintiff to undergo the ordeal of litigation, this reform proposal will, 
admittedly, not keep the defendant from being subject to a defamation 
action. However, it is plausible that the repair effort will satisfy a sub-
stantial share of potential plaintiffs, who will thus not pursue any fur-
ther legal remedy. As for the plaintiffs who are not thereby deterred 
from litigation, they are permitted to recover damages only for the 
harm proved to be caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct and 
not subsequently alleviated. 
The primary advantage of this option to the defendant is the elimi-
nation of unpredictable and virtually unlimited liability associated 
with both presumed damages and estimates of future emotional dis-
tress. Failure to exercise the option in a satisfactory manner would 
not only leave the defendant subject to liability for presumed dam-
ages,292 but also may aggravate the emotional harm for which the 
plaintiff could assert a claim for relief.293 
To summarize this second option, upon receipt of the notification 
and request as a result of the plaintiff's exercise of the first option, the 
defendant must produce sufficient evidence upon which it could be 
determined that the defendant was justified in believing the truth of 
the published defamatory material. If the defendant does so, such evi-
dence should serve as the basis of a summary judgment for the defend-
ant if the plaintiff actually sues. If the plaintiff's publication is not 
justified in this way, the defendant must attempt to repair the harm 
caused by its publication by devoting an amount of resources similar to 
those used in publishing the defamatory material. Should the defend-
ant satisfactorily perform the repair, the plaintiff may not recover 
either damages for unproven harm to reputation or damages for emo-
tional harm suffered after the date on which repair has been 
completed. 
Together, these two options are designed to get the parties talking 
to each other promptly and working out an arrangement that can 
avoid litigation. There is no legal compulsion for either party to exer-
cise its option. The effect of a plaintiff's failure to exercise the first 
option is the inability to recover certain items of damages that might 
otherwise be available. The effect of the defendant's failure to exer-
cise the second option is the continued exposure to items of damages 
that could be avoided by taking the option. One might expect the 
adoption of this reform proposal to avoid at least some of the harm 
that might be caused by defamatory publications, to reduce the finan-
292. This is assuming that the constitutionally required predicate for such damages 
can be established by the plaintiff. See supra note 277. 
293. See supra note 290. 
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cial risks attached to a judgment of liability for defamation, and to 
foster the social interest in a non-judicial resolution of disputes when 
it is possible to satisfy the parties without resorting to litigation. 
B. A Restriction on the Availability of Punitive Damages 
Along with presumed damages, punitive damages constitute a 
source of substantial uncertainty with regard to defamation liability. 
This uncertainty could cause the accompanying risk of self-censorship 
to rise even higher than it might otherwise.294 Although presumed 
damages and punitive damages have been lumped together in terms of 
the constitutional restrictions placed on their recovery,295 the two 
types of damages have different functions and should be subject to dif-
ferent tort rules governing their availability. Presumed damages, at 
least in theory, are intended to serve a pure compensatory function for 
reputational harm that the plaintiff has not and perhaps cannot prove 
was actually suffered. Presumed damages are thus the compensatory 
remedy for harm that is likely to have been suffered but that, for 
whatever reason, the plaintiff has not been required to prove. Pre-
sumed damages compensate for presumed harm, and as demonstrated 
in the preceding section, the presumption that unproven harm has oc-
curred can be negated in a way that eliminates the theoretical under-
pinnings of an award of presumed damages. 
Punitive damages play a different, noncompensatory role.296 Such 
damages are intended to punish the party against whom they are as-
sessed for socially unacceptable conduct and to deter that party and 
others similarly situated from engaging in that conduct in the fu-
ture.297 In the context of defamation, this remedy raises the question 
of whether the current constitutional restrictions on the recovery of 
punitive damages29S are sufficient to serve as the guideline for an 
award of these noncompensatory damages. For a number of reasons, 
the constitutional restrictions should be considered inadequate as the 
sole means of deciding on the appropriateness of an award of punitive 
damages. The final reform proposal offered here attempts to comple-
ment those constitutional restrictions with a set of tort law limitations 
on the recovery of such damages that are more carefully tailored to 
the circumstances encountered in a case of harm caused by the publi-
cation of false and defamatory statements. 
Under the current law of defamation, any plaintiff who established 
that the defendant published false and defamatory statements with 
knowledge of the falsity of the statements or reckless disregard of the 
294. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964). 
295. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
296. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 23 (1984). 
297. Id. at 23-24. 
298. See supra notes109-15 and accompanying text (discussion of the third Gertz rule). 
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truth or falsity is constitutionally permitted to recover punitive dam.-
ages.299 It is possible that the requirement of proving New York Times 
actual malice operates more as a deterrent to bringing suit than it does 
as an effective bar to recovery for many plaintiffs who are not de-
terred.aoo Furthermore, in at least some cases plaintiffs are permitted 
to recover punitive damages without even having to prove New York 
Times actual malice.ao1 Under these assumptions, the potential scope 
of recovery of punitive damages is nowhere near as narrow as an ini-
tial glance at the constitutional protections might lead one to believe. 
In order to restrict the scope of such damages, the following reforms 
should be enacted as a matter of tort law, that is, regardless of either 
the desirability or the practicability of obtaining further constitutional 
limitations on punitive damages. 
First, punitive damages ought to be unavailable to anyone who 
meets the current constitutional definition of a public official.302 Any 
punishment of citizens through a civil action should be considered to 
be inconsistent with the official status of such a plaintiff. To the ex-
tent that punitive damages enable a public official to accomplish what 
the government would otherwise have to try to accomplish through a 
criminal prosecution,aoa such damages should be eliminated and the 
punishment function left to the operation of the criminal law. 
Second, and most important, punitive damages should be awarded 
only on a combined showing of (a) an objectively reasonable ability of 
the defendant to have anticipated the capacity of the published mate-
rial to inflict harm on the plaintiff, i.e., apparent defamatory potential, 
(b) an objectively reasonable basis for a conclusion that, at the time of 
publication, the defendant had an insufficient basis on which to con-
clude that the published material was true, i.e., fault-as-to-falsity that 
at least rises to the level of negligence, and (c) a subjectively wrongful 
state of mind that consisted of either (i) intent to cause harm to the 
plaintiff or (ii) a reckless indifference to the high likelihood of harm 
to the plaintiff. Without proof of all three of these elements, defama-
tory potential, fault-as-to-falsity, and deliberate or reckless disregard 
of the plaintiff's interest in freedom from reputational and emotional 
harm, a plaintiff should not be permitted to recover punitive damages, 
regardless of the constitutional acceptability of such recovery. 
These prerequisites constituting the heart of this last tort reform 
proposal differ from the New York Times actual malice requirement, 
299. Id. 
300. See supra note 273. 
301. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (private 
plaintiff can recover punitive damages on a showing of less than "actual malice" if 
the defamatory statements do not involve a matter of public concern). 
302. See supra note 28. 
303. See supra note 294. 
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the threshold to the recovery of punitive damages in cases of public 
plaintiffs and those private plaintiffs about whom defamatory matters 
of public concern are published.304 The "actual malice" element of 
contemporary constitutional defamation law consists of a state of mind 
regarding only the truth or falsity of the published communication. In 
contrast, the additional requirements imposed by this reform proposal 
bring the focus around to what is surely a sounder basis for deciding 
whether punitive damages are appropriate, namely, the defendant's 
decision to publish material without taking anywhere near adequate 
measures to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm. 
Punitive damages are generally intended to inflict harm on the de-
fendant who acts in socially unacceptable ways and to act as a deter-
rent to conduct of that sort. The suggested prerequisite accomplishes 
a shift in focus from the fairly nebulous and somewhat dangerous cri-
terion of truth or falsitysos to the proposed combination of elements 
that places concern for the possibility of causing harm to the plaintiff 
at the center of the inquiry. This shift ought to promote the legitimate 
functions of punitive damages more effectively without producing the 
adverse consequences that can accompany either the threat or the ac-
tual award of such damages in situations in which socially acceptable 
or even socially desirable conduct is contemplated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Picture, if you will, a television set whose badly distorted picture is 
undecipherable to its owner, who calls in a number of repair person-
nel. One group of experts looks at the screen and says, "We need to 
have a different method of transmission of signals. Besides, radio is 
better." Another group of experts says, "We could get the flesh tones 
a little more realistic with a twenty degree turn of the tint knob." One 
would probably be sympathetic to the set owner who curtly dismissed 
both groups of experts. 
A careful survey of contemporary defamation cases might support 
the proposition that the law of defamation as it stands at present is 
analogous to that television set. The constitutional battle will, and 
should, continue, but that does not mean that reforms on other levels 
or in other arenas should be postponed. Fine tuning of the law of defa-
mation also will, and should, continue. But to return to the television 
set image, it is necessary to stabilize the picture before we care very 
much about the color. 
This Article does not pretend to be a complete program of reform 
of the law of defamation, nor is its author so pretentious as to presume 
that even the reforms offered here would not benefit from careful 
304. See supra note 298. 
305. See supra note 210. 
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consideration by those who are concerned about the state of this body 
of law. The claim that the author does make for the Article is that it 
offers practicable and fair solutions to four major problems in the cur- · 
rent law of defamation: first, the ability to criticize government is se-
cured by an absolute immunity for speech about government; second, 
the flourishing of new theories of liability in order to avoid constitu-
tional protections is arrested by the elevation of the emotional harm 
component to an equal footing with the traditional element of reputa-
tional injury; third, the susceptibility to presumed damages is placed 
under the control of the parties through a series of options designed to 
reduce harm and to resolve the dispute without litigation; and fourth, 
the use of punitive damages is curbed by a prohibition against their 
award to public official plaintiffs and by a more restrictive tort stan-
dard that must be satisfied in any case in which they are sought. Fur-
thermore, the proposals are structured in a fashion that permits those 
reforms to be enacted consistent with but nevertheless separate from 
the evolving and awkward body of constitutional rules on the subject. 
